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Our legal system is deeply inconsistent in regard to the role that 
emotions can and should play at trial.  To the extent our rules of evidence 
discuss emotions at all, they characterize them as an improper influence 
on jury decision-making.1  When judges address emotions in the context 
of jury instructions, they are usually cautioning jurors that they must 
suppress their feelings and decide cases without reference to “sympathy” 
or other emotional influences.2  Likewise, when evidence scholars have 
created models of how jurors decide cases, emotions usually play little, if 
any, role in their accounts.3  Indeed, it is usually assumed that “[t]o label 
an influence ‘emotional’ is to say it is inappropriate—the very opposite 
of the reasoned discourse on which the legal system is premised.”4 
Conversely, there are times when emotions are treated as a valuable 
part of the trial process.  In classes on legal writing and trial advocacy, 
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 1.  See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note (allowing judges to exclude 
evidence based on “unfair prejudice” and defining that term to mean an “undue tendency to suggest 
decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one”). 
 2.  See, e.g., FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT §§ 1.01, 3.13, 
7.24 (2009) [hereinafter SEVENTH CIR. JURY INSTRUCTIONS]; VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, 
JUDGING THE JURY 131 (1986) [hereinafter JUDGING THE JURY] (quoting Judge Jerome Frank’s 
description of “Mr. Prejudice” as a “thirteenth juror” that judges must always reckon with, along 
with his companion, “Miss Sympathy”). 
 3.  See discussion infra Part III. 
 4.  Susan A. Bandes, Repellent Crimes and Rational Deliberation: Emotion and the Death 
Penalty, 33 VT. L. REV. 489, 493 (2009). 
SPOTTSWOOD FINAL 11/11/2014  9:49 AM 
42 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 63 
we teach law students to frame arguments to convince the reader, not just 
with logic and precedent, but also with moral and emotional weight.  
Likewise, when lawyers take cases to trial, they consider juror feelings 
from start to finish, using voir dire to search for sympathetic jurors,5 and 
selecting their theories, evidence, and arguments to craft an emotionally 
compelling case.6  From this perspective, it sometimes seems that, as 
Clarence Darrow observed, “the main work of a trial lawyer is to make a 
jury like his client, or, at least to feel sympathy for him; facts regarding 
the crime are relatively unimportant.”7  Nor are advocates the only 
people who think that emotions should play a role in the process.8  In 
fact, even judges will occasionally bless the inclusion of emotional 
influences as part of the trial process, such as in the context of capital 
sentencing.9 
This tension creates a curious impasse.  Lawyers view the trial as an 
emotional battleground, in which they must compete for a jury’s 
sympathy.  Judges, by contrast, usually see such influences as improper, 
but view their role in restraining these skirmishes as a limited one, based 
on the widespread understanding that they should err on the side of 
liberal inclusion of as much relevant evidence as possible.10  As a result, 
jurors find themselves positioned awkwardly in the middle, caught 
between advocates who strive to engage their feelings and judges who 
demand that they perform heroic feats of emotional control. 
One would hope that the academic literature would be immune to 
such polarized views on a topic this important, but one would be wrong.  
On the one hand, scholars frequently assume that emotional influences 
                                                          
 5.  See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutors & Peremptories, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1478 
(2012) (quoting advice from one manual for prosecutors about how they can “shape the jury in 
[their] favor”); NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 95 (2007) 
(recounting a training provided by one assistant district attorney to new prosecutors, in which he 
“urg[ed] them to look for conviction-prone jurors who are predisposed to accept the government’s 
claims at face value”). 
 6.  See, e.g., H. Mitchell Caldwell & Janelle L. Davis, Timeless Lessons from the Masters, 35 
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 19, 32–35 (2011) (collecting advice from veteran trial lawyers regarding ways 
that advocates can “find and exploit the pathos” in a case). 
 7.  JUDGING THE JURY, supra note 2, at 131. 
 8.  See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S10,366 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2005) (statement of Sen. Obama) 
(arguing that, in hard cases, “the critical ingredient is supplied by what is in the judge’s heart”). 
 9.  See Teneille R. Brown, The Affective Blindness of Evidence Law, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 47, 
80–81 (2011) (discussing the law’s ambivalent embrace of emotions in that context, in which 
“[j]urors are told to simultaneously use emotion to show mercy, but remove emotion for all other 
sentencing purposes”). 
 10.  See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 4:12 (4th 
ed. 2010) (collecting cases). 
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are distinct and separable from a process of reasoned decision-making, 
and that the best fact-finding process would be one where emotional 
influences are minimized, if not excluded altogether.11  On the other 
hand, there are many who have argued that the problem is not that we 
have too much emotion in the process, but too little.  These authors 
believe that judges who feel a broader scope of empathy for the suffering 
of others will make fairer decisions.12  And while a small number of 
scholars have recently taken some steps to bridge this divide, they have 
found it easier to criticize existing views than to offer constructive 
suggestions as to how the system could be reformed.13 
In this article, I hope to bridge the gap between those who would 
exclude emotion from the trial and those who wish it to take a more 
central place.  As I will explain, emotions sometimes aid and sometimes 
hinder good decision-making.  Furthermore, these effects will persist 
even if juries try to resist their pull, because most emotional influences 
occur automatically at an unconscious level of our minds.  Using this 
more nuanced picture, I suggest some ways that judges could use 
existing rules to better manage emotions in the courtroom, as well as 
reforms to existing rules and practices to give judges more guidance and 
encouragement in doing so. 
My account of emotional influences at trial draws on the dual 
process model of cognition, which posits that we regularly draw on two 
very different kinds of mental resources.  One kind of thinking, 
frequently labeled “System 1,” is the domain of intuitive judgments and 
actions, which we can perform rapidly and without perceiving any 
mental effort.  This cognitive system is active during every moment of 
                                                          
 11.  See, e.g., PAUL THAGARD, HOT THOUGHT: MECHANISMS AND APPLICATIONS OF 
EMOTIONAL COGNITION 155–56 (2006) (maintaining that “if emotional bias helps to prevent the jury 
from arriving at true answers, then . . . [its] influence . . . would seem to be normatively 
inappropriate” and that in an ideal system the influence of emotion should be “minor” compared to 
“the rational assessment” of the evidence); LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: 
AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 51–54 (2006) (attacking the idea that the reasonable doubt 
standard should depend on the strength of a juror’s conviction because their subjective feelings are 
“apt to be ill founded, prejudicial, and irrational” when compared with the outcome of a rational 
process of “reasoning through the evidence”); see also D. Michael Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, 
Johnny Lynn Old Chief, and “Legitimate Moral Force”: Keeping the Courtroom Safe for 
Heartstrings and Gore, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 445 (1998) (asserting that “the horror of the crime 
changes the operational notion of what constitutes a reasonable doubt”). 
 12.  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Emotions Versus Emotionalism in Law, in THE PASSIONS OF 
LAW 309, 310 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, & LAW 247–
48, 258–59 (1993). 
 13.  See generally discussion, infra Part II.C. 
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our waking lives, and it allows us to perform dazzling mental feats 
without even realizing their complexity.  With its help, we can navigate 
our way through traffic, discern the emotional state of another person 
based on their tone of voice, or recognize distant faces in a crowd, 
swiftly and effortlessly.14  System 1 seems to accomplish much of this 
magic by being a powerful pattern-learning and pattern-recognizing 
machine.15  With repeated experiences or by practicing complicated 
actions, we can automate the processes of recognizing similar scenarios 
and responding to them appropriately.  Even more strikingly, we can 
learn to recognize and respond to patterns even when we cannot 
consciously perceive them or describe their structure.16 
System 2, by contrast, is the realm of deliberative rationality.  Unlike 
System 1, this kind of thinking takes place within conscious awareness; it 
is able to apply new rules and to manipulate abstract symbol structures, 
and it can focus its attention on a particular target and resist distractions 
or temptations.17  When we are solving a math problem, analyzing an 
intricate statutory scheme, restraining our automatic desire to eat tasty 
things, or awkwardly practicing a new and unlearned skill, we engage in 
a very different kind of mental processing than occurs effortlessly within 
System 1.  In all of these settings, we cannot accomplish our task unless 
our mind remains fixed on a single topic and we proceed slowly and 
carefully.  The great power of System 2 enables us to solve problems that 
are entirely unfamiliar to us and to perform actions that we have never 
                                                          
 14.  See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 19–24 (2012) (introducing key 
features of System 1 and System 2). 
 15.  See id. at 50–58; TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE 
ADAPTIVE UNCONSCIOUS 24–27 (2002) (comparing implicit learning, which is “learning without 
effort or awareness of exactly what has been learned” to explicit learning, which is “effortful” and 
“conscious”); Eliot R. Smith & Jamie DeCoster, Dual-Process Models in Social and Cognitive 
Psychology: Conceptual Integration and Links to Underlying Memory Systems, 4 PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 108, 111 (2000); Steven A. Sloman, The Empirical Case for Two Systems of 
Reasoning, 119 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 4 (1996) (claiming that “associative reasoning inherits a 
property of associative systems” by computing on the “basis of similarity and temporal structure”).  
But see Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social 
Cognition, 59 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 255, 261 (2008) (doubting that some versions of the dual-
process framework, such as the heuristic/systematic processing account, can be reconciled with 
associationism). 
 16.  See, e.g., Arnaud Destrebecqz & Axel Cleeremans, Can Sequence Learning Be Implicit? 
New Evidence with the Process Dissociation Procedure, 8 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 343, 347–
49 (2001) (concluding that “awareness is not always necessary for learning to occur”); Antoine 
Bechara et al., Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy, 275 SCI. 1293, 
1293–96 (1997) (suggesting that “nonconscious biases guide behavior before conscious knowledge 
does”). 
 17.  See KAHNEMAN, supra note 14, at 22–24. 
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learned in the past.  Unfortunately, this power comes at a significant cost, 
because maintaining such focus both limits our ability to attend to other 
matters and saps our mental energies.  The longer we employ this 
resource, the more tired we will become and the less energy we will find 
that we have available for other tasks.18 
Applied to fact-finding, the dual-process framework illustrates the 
ways that a judge or juror’s intuitive feelings and deliberative thoughts 
will interact as she tries to resolve a case.19  As I will explain later, 
emotions have many functions at the System 1 level that are not 
commonly understood.  Emotions do not merely bias a decision-maker 
towards one party and against another.  Rather, as jurors listen to 
evidence, their emotions automatically shape what aspects of the 
witness’s testimony and demeanor they notice and which of these details 
they overlook and forget.20  Later, when jurors deliberate, the emotions 
that they have associated with particular parties and facts in the case will 
shape what details of the evidence they remember, and what conclusions 
they find palatable.  Depending on the source and type of emotion, these 
effects will sometimes heighten their ability to render good decisions, 
and at other times undermine it.  But the critical point is that trying to 
separate the products of emotion from those of reason will generally be 
futile, because emotions are an inherent component of rational fact-
finding, rather than something that competes with or undermines it.21 
Given the inextricable link between emotions and reasoning, the 
dominant judicial responses to juror emotion are inadequate.  First, 
recognizing the pervasiveness of emotionally resonant evidence makes it 
                                                          
 18.  See Martin S. Hagger et al., Ego Depletion and the Strength Model of Self-Control: A 
Meta-Analysis, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 495, 496 (2010) (stating a major tenet of the strength model is 
that “engaging in acts of self-control draws from a limited ‘reservoir’ of self-control that, when 
depleted, results in reduced capacity for further self-regulation”); E.J. Masicampo & Roy F. 
Baumeister, Toward a Physiology of Dual-Process Reasoning and Judgment: Lemonade, Willpower, 
and Expensive Rule-Based Analysis, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 255, 259 (2008) (noting “System 2 decision 
making may involve analyses that are expensive and effortful”). 
 19.  See generally Mark Spottswood, The Hidden Structure of Fact-Finding, 64 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 131, 171–93 (2013) [hereinafter Hidden Structure] (articulating the roles that the two 
systems might play as a jury hears evidence and deliberates towards a verdict); Mark Spottswood, 
Bridging the Gap Between Bayesian and Story-Comparison Models of Juridical Inference, 13 LAW, 
PROBABILITY & RISK 47, 47–49 (2014) [hereinafter Bridging the Gap] (arguing that this model 
provides a better framework for analyzing many questions of evidentiary policy than pre-existing 
accounts of juridical inference). 
 20.  See discussion, infra Part IV. 
 21.  See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN 
BRAIN xvi–xvii (2005); GERD GIGERENZER, GUT FEELINGS: THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE 
UNCONSCIOUS 36–38 (2007). 
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obvious that excluding all such evidence will be either futile or 
counterproductive.  Second, recognizing that jurors cannot fully separate 
their emotions from their deliberative judgments, and that trying to do so 
will sap their mental energies, implies that judges are unlikely to achieve 
good results by resorting to limiting instructions that direct jurors to 
suppress their feelings.  Jurors have a limited ability to control what they 
feel, and too much effort spent controlling their feelings will distract 
them from carefully considering the details of the case before them.  
Taken together, these two insights suggest that, rather than trying to 
exclude all emotional influences at trial, judges should intervene 
selectively when feelings are likely to be disruptive, and they should 
draw on a broader set of tools to dampen such feelings before they arise. 
On the practical front, I suggest a number of reforms designed to 
improve the legal system’s handling of emotions at trial.  First, I propose 
a taxonomy that judges and other analysts can draw on to distinguish 
problematic emotional impacts from beneficial ones.  Second, I outline 
several ways that judges can use their trial management discretion to 
limit emotional impacts without excluding the underlying evidence.  
Third, I propose a revised Rule 403, which would help draw judges’ 
attention to these available alternatives and make the need for their use 
more apparent.  Fourth, I recommend that trial judges receive instruction 
on how emotions influence cognition when they are first appointed to the 
bench, in order to narrow the gap between judicial common sense and 
scientific understanding.  And finally, I suggest a means by which parties 
may raise objections to emotionally inflammatory evidence at bench 
trials without revealing that information to the presiding judge.  Reforms 
like these would move the legal system towards a more balanced 
treatment of emotions at trial, in which feelings are both acknowledged 
and accepted as part of the process, but where their potential to 
undermine the accuracy of fact-finding is reduced. 
This article will proceed as follows.  Part II provides background on 
the existing literature on emotional influences at trial.  Part III will 
describe my own dual-process model of fact-finding and show its 
capacity to provide a more nuanced understanding of the role that 
emotions play in the trial process.  Part IV will draw on this framework 
to offer practical suggestions for reform of the trial process. 
II. FACTS AND FEELINGS IN LEGAL DISCOURSE 
Disagreements over the role of emotion within the law, in general, 
and within trials more specifically, span the history of legal discourse.  
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To simplify things and introduce the questions to be considered in this 
Article, I will review this voluminous literature and identify three major 
families of views one encounters within it.  I shall refer to the oldest, and 
still dominant, set of assumptions as the “classical” view.  Those who 
subscribe to this viewpoint see emotions as dangerous forces that are 
likely to corrupt the fact-finding process by displacing the role of cool, 
unemotional reason.  The classical view can be contrasted usefully with 
two other theoretical positions.  A competing approach, which I will 
label the “Humean” view, suggests that emotions may lend wisdom of 
their own to legal decision-making, that they are usually too powerful to 
resist in any event, and that attempts to silence or ignore them will tend 
to worsen the quality of justice.  A third alternative offers a synthesis of 
the two positions, urging that the value of emotions in fact-finding will 
vary depending on the situation, in some cases improving the quality of 
justice and in others worsening it.  This “contextual” viewpoint draws 
more directly from cognitive psychology and neuroscience research, 
which suggest that emotions and moods are critical to the normal 
operation of human reasoning, but also malleable in response to external 
forces, making us potentially susceptible to manipulation and errors.  
This third approach is far more promising than either the classical or the 
Humean perspectives, but it remains at an early stage of development. 
A. The Classical View 
Many writers, both past and present, find it normatively intolerable 
for emotions to play a significant role in shaping trial outcomes, and urge 
that any such influences should be suppressed.22  This view has roots 
stretching back to antiquity.  Aristotle, for instance, argued that law 
should be “an intellect devoid of desire.”23  Passion and emotion, he 
warned, are inherently corrupting, even in the hands of the best of us.24  
Fairness and justice, in this framing, are the products of cold-hearted 
rationality, not feelings.  This view found many other notable adherents 
in Western moral philosophy.  Those in the Kantian tradition frequently 
urge that moral decisions must follow from principles of logic and reason 
                                                          
 22.  See generally Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Moody View of the Law: Looking Back and 
Looking Ahead at Law and the Emotions, 56 EMOTION AND THE LAW: PSYCHOLO. PERSP. 185 
(2010) (providing an overview of the literature on emotions and their legal repercussions, including 
research finding that the two do not mix well). 
 23.  ARISTOTLE, 3 POLITICS 1287a (translation by the author). 
 24.   Id. 
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regardless of our emotional feelings,25 and Christian theology has often 
viewed giving in to emotional temptations as a form of sinfulness and 
imperfection.26  Such views have helped to create a dominant cultural 
narrative in which emotions operate as “an untrustworthy force that 
cripples judgment.”27 
With so many powerful and influential proponents, it should come as 
no surprise that a similar normative vision became embedded in modern 
American legal discourse.28  For example, John Henry Wigmore, in 
writing what was perhaps the most influential treatise on Anglo-
American evidence ever published,29 articulated several rationales for 
rules that exclude some evidence from the jury’s consideration.  Among 
his reasons for exclusion, he included the fact that, amidst the “surging 
emotions” of a courtroom, a jury may easily be led astray.30  Likewise, 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, which have served as a model for most 
state codes of evidence,31 strongly embody the classical view.  For 
instance, the frequently invoked “catch-all” exclusionary provision, Rule 
403, gives trial judges wide discretion to exclude evidence whenever the 
                                                          
 25.   See, e.g., CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, THE CONSTITUTION OF AGENCY: ESSAYS ON 
PRACTICAL REASON AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY (2008) (discussing Kant’s famous denial that there 
was any moral worth in an action motivated by an emotion of sympathy rather than by reason); 
Christine M. Korsgaard, Morality and the Distinctiveness of Human Action, in PRIMATES AND 
PHILOSOPHERS 98, 112 (2006) (arguing that resisting the pull of one’s desires and emotions is a 
central part of what it means to be moral). 
 26.  JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF 
EMOTIONAL LIFE 24 (1998); William Wainwright, Concepts of God, in THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 2 (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring ed. 2013), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts-god/#Imp (discussing the theological doctrine of 
“impassibility,” according to which God is said to be a being too perfect to be touched by suffering 
or other emotive states); see also C.S. LEWIS, MERE CHRISTIANITY 132–33 (1952) (suggesting that 
one cannot “get eternal life by simply feeling the presence of god,” but must “learn[] and think[] 
about the Christian doctrines”).  But cf. Robert Roberts, Emotions in the Christian Tradition, in THE 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 2 (Edward N. Zalta ed., Summer ed. 2011), available 
at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/emotion-Christian-tradition/ (arguing that 
emotions such as gratitude, compassion, and contrition are seen as a positive and moral force in 
much Christian thinking). 
 27.  Brown, supra note 9, at 55. 
 28.   See generally John Leubsdorf, Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 
1245–46 (2006) (discussing the “familiar proposition that evidence law . . . seeks trials governed by 
reason rather than emotion”). 
 29.   See WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM & WIGMORE 109 n.1 (1985). 
(describing Wigmore’s extensive influence in the legal field). 
 30.   Id. at 157. 
 31.  Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused’s Criminal History: The Trouble with Rule 404(b), 
78 TEMP. L. REV. 201, 212 (2005) (noting that “[f]orty-one states, the District of Columbia, the 
Virgin Islands, and Guam have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence in one form or another”). 
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danger of “unfair prejudice” may outweigh its probative value.  In case 
we had any doubts as to what the drafters meant by the term “unfair 
prejudice,” the advisory committee’s notes clarify that such prejudice 
arises when decisions rest on an “improper basis, commonly, though not 
necessarily, an emotional one.”32  Going along with this guidance, 
numerous cases uphold the authority of district judges to exclude 
evidence whenever they think that it will inspire strong emotions that 
lead to irrational decision-making.33  The mainstream view held by 
judges and lawmakers, put simply, is that the “appropriate role for . . . 
emotion generally in legal judgment is no role at all.”34 
The classical viewpoint is rarely defended explicitly in modern 
scholarship, but it often operates as an unstated assumption when 
scholars are making other arguments.  Larry Laudan, in his study of the 
epistemic rationality of criminal trial practices, seeks to draw a sharp line 
between objective questions concerning the logical strength of 
evidentiary inferences and the subjective strength of a juror’s belief in 
guilt or innocence.  The latter, in his view, is irrelevant to any question of 
interest in a criminal trial, and as a result he castigates judges for 
instructing jurors to rely on their subjective doubts when deciding 
whether to convict.35  Other scholars seem to assume, in a similar way, 
that feelings and reason are opposing forces, and that any emotional 
influence is generally a harmful one.36 
B. The Humean View 
The classical view tends to dominate in the legal world, but it does 
not go unquestioned.  The philosopher David Hume offered a striking 
counterpoint to the classical distrust of emotionality: “Reason is, and 
                                                          
 32.  See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note. 
 33.   See, e.g., United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1252 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding that 
“implications of child molestation, homosexuality, and abuse of women unfairly prejudice a 
defendant” because such things are highly inflammatory); see generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, 
supra note 10, at § 4.13 (collecting authority for the proposition that the “greatest danger” that 403 
protects against is the “injection of powerful emotional elements” into a trial). 
 34.  Neal R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65 TENN. L. 
REV. 1, 13 (1997). 
 35.  LAUDAN, supra note 11, at 51–54. 
 36.  See, e.g., THAGARD, supra note 11, at 153–56 (2006) (treating emotional “valence” as a 
separate force from reason within his model of legal fact-finding, and suggesting that the process 
would function best if such influences were kept to a “minor” influence in comparison with “rational 
assessment of . . . competing hypotheses”); Risinger, supra note 11, at 445–46 (worrying that strong 
emotions encourage jurors to apply shifting standards as to what constitutes a “reasonable” doubt). 
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ought only to be, the slave of the passions,” because “[a]bstract or 
demonstrative reasoning” cannot tell us what ends are worth pursuing 
absent input from our fears and desires.37  This anti-classical view posits 
that, without feelings, we can have no goals, and thus nothing to direct 
our reason towards.  In such a framing, any attempts to exclude emotion 
from the process of decision-making can only render the resulting 
decisions either pointless or perverse.  In this worldview, removing the 
feelings from fact-finding leads to arbitrariness rather than accuracy. 
Although the Humean view is less dominant in legal practice and 
discourse than the classical view, it does have strong defenders.  One 
notable judicial champion is Richard Posner.  As Posner sees it, there can 
be “no action without emotion,” because emotions are necessary to 
motivate us towards particular ends.38  Emotions can sometimes lead 
judges to make bad decisions, such as when a “person has given undue 
salience to one feature of the situation and its associated emotional 
stimulus, neglecting other important features.”39  But judges, in his view, 
can best combat these tendencies not by trying to silence the voice of 
emotion, but rather by drawing on a broader range of emotional stimuli.  
As he sees it, emotions will often lead judges to make bad decisions if 
judges narrowly confine their attention to what they see in the courtroom, 
because it will be easier to feel empathy for “a well-represented litigant 
pleading before you” than absent or less-eloquent parties who may be 
equally affected by a decision in the case.40  But because emotions are 
necessary for any judicial action to be taken, the remedy for this is not a 
“cold” detachment but rather a broadened sense of empathy, which can 
enable the judge to engage in an “imaginative reconstruction of the 
feelings and interests of absent persons potentially affected by the 
judge’s decision.”41  Thus, rather than suppress their emotions, Posner 
urges judges to try to feel both deeply and broadly, in order to give 
appropriate weight to all the issues at stake in a case. 
Robin West has endorsed a similar view, although her account 
emphasizes the importance of deep empathetic engagement with 
individual litigants rather than a broad scope of sympathy.  West notes 
                                                          
 37.  DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE § 2.3.3, at 265–66 (Norton & Norton eds., 
2007). 
 38.  Posner, supra note 12, at 310. 
 39.  Id. at 311. 
 40.  Id. at 324. 
 41.  Id. 
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that members of disadvantaged groups often face a particular challenge.42  
Those in power may have a radically incomplete understanding of the 
challenges that historically subjugated groups experience, both because 
their own lives do not include similar challenges and because the 
disadvantaged may tend to conceal the differences in their own lives as a 
way of blending in and getting along.43  As she sees it, “when empathic 
understanding is most urgently needed, it is hardest to achieve.”44  But 
West does not see this problem as insurmountable; rather, through the 
power of “metaphor and narrative,” we may hope to “understand what 
was initially foreign.”45  Thus she, along with other writers in the 
narrativist tradition,46 views the trial as a forum in which “rich 
descriptions of our uniquely private and subjective lives” can help “an 
otherwise silenced litigant to win the sympathy of someone in a position 
of power.”47 
It has been rare for judges or rule-makers to rely on a Humean 
conception of emotion.  Still, one does find such tendencies on occasion.  
For example, during the sentencing phase of capital cases, the official 
position on emotions is “more is more.”  Judges routinely admit a wide 
array of emotionally charged evidence without inquiring overmuch into 
its non-emotional relevance.  Thus, for instance, in Payne v. Tennessee, 
the Supreme Court held that it was generally appropriate for prosecutors 
to introduce evidence regarding the “emotional impact of the crimes on a 
victim’s family” during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial.48  
Although a prior decision had characterized such evidence as irrelevant 
to the “blameworthiness of a particular defendant” whenever the 
defendant was unaware of the victim’s family circumstances,49 the Payne 
Court saw things differently.  “By turning the victim into a ‘faceless 
                                                          
 42.  See WEST, supra  note 12, at 258 (noting, as an example, the difficulty for a “member of 
the racial majority in a racist society to empathize with the . . . pain of a racial minority”). 
 43.  Id. at 247–48, 258–59. 
 44.  Id. at 258; see also Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of Judicial Empathy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 
1944, 1990–92 (2012) (noting some limitations on judges’ abilities to empathize with others). 
 45.  WEST, supra note 12, at 259. 
 46.  See generally Kenworthey Bilz, We Don’t Want to Hear It: Psychology, Literature, and the 
Narrative Model of Judging, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 429, 435–441 (surveying this tradition). 
 47.  WEST, supra note 12, at 338; see also Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories 
Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 825–30 (1993) (expressing a 
similar sentiment, but also worrying that such tactics will often be ineffective, given that “insiders” 
will often be “defensive or dismissive”). 
 48.  501 U.S. 808, 817 (1991). 
 49.  Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 50405 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 
U.S. 808 (1991). 
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stranger at the penalty phase of a capital trial,’” the Court worried the 
exclusion of victim impact evidence “deprives the State of the full moral 
force of its evidence and may prevent the jury from having before it all 
the information necessary to determine the proper punishment for a first-
degree murder.”50  The Court, in other words, took the rather Humean 
position that the remedy for potential emotional prejudice arising in the 
mitigation case was emotionally charged counter-evidence, rather than 
exclusion. 
C. Contextual Accounts of Emotion 
So far, we have seen two strongly opposed visions of the role of 
emotions in the trial process.  Proponents of the classical view perceive 
passions as corrosive of neutrality and fairness.  In contrast, a few 
authors have urged that the arousal of empathy can overcome innate 
tendencies towards biased decision-making.  In more recent years, 
however, there has been an emergence of a third wave of legal 
scholarship on trial emotions, which seeks to paint a more nuanced 
picture of the field.  In this new tradition, authors have stressed the need 
for close attention to the specific context in which emotional states arise, 
arguing that the impact of emotional arousal is hard to predict and 
situationally variable.  Unfortunately, however, authors propounding the 
contextual view have displayed a tendency towards passivity, in which 
they rightfully denounce orthodox views about emotion but fail to 
suggest useful reforms to existing practices. 
One common point of agreement in the contextual tradition is that 
emotional arousal is a complex thing that defies simple, categorical 
labels.  Jeremy Blumenthal’s brief overview of recent law and emotions 
research provides an instructive example.  After noting the well-
entrenched classical and Humean positions, he notes a nascent shift 
toward work that subjects common sense assumptions about emotional 
cognition to rigorous testing based on “solid, sophisticated psychological 
theory.”51  Blumenthal’s review illustrates the need for caution before 
one makes sweeping statements about these topics.  As he explains, 
modern psychological theory regarding the emotions is a complex 
terrain, offering many fine distinctions that an unwary reader might miss: 
                                                          
 50.  Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (quoting S. Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 821 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)). 
 51.  Blumenthal, supra note 22, at 188. 
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For instance, a chronic and persistent mood might have different 
behavioral implications than a more focused and transitory emotion, even 
if we gave similar labels to both states.52  Likewise, emotions with 
similar valence—such as fear, anger, and disgust, all of which we would 
label as “negative” emotions—may also require separate analysis if we 
are to anticipate their effects.53  And psychologists have explored yet 
another fault line, showing that anticipated emotions,54 meaning our 
expectations regarding our future feelings, both motivate our actions and 
yet often fail to line up with reality.55  Finally, we must remember that, 
even as psychology helps to illustrate central tendencies in emotional 
cognition, its descriptions of general tendencies may obscure individual 
differences in emotional expression and self-control abilities.56 
The result of taking this complexity into account is that we must be 
wary of simple “solutions” to the “problem” of emotions in the trial 
process.  Thus, as Blumenthal summarizes, the common judicial 
assumption that people can suppress the effects of their moods and 
emotions when thinking about a case turns out to be neither clearly true 
nor clearly false.  Instead, what we see is subtle situational variance.  
Attempts to suppress feelings work better for some emotions than others, 
may result in an overcorrection that does more harm than good, and may 
also deplete reserves of self-control, which can lead to other defects in 
judgment and reasoning.57  Indeed, such considerations have led some to 
doubt the practical value of any categorical recommendations that we 
might make in this arena.58 
                                                          
 52.  See generally Blumenthal, supra note 22. 
 53.  For instance, anger seems to induce a quicker, more reactive decision-making style, while 
sadness pushes us towards slower, more deliberative thinking.  Terry A. Maroney, Angry Judges, 65 
VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1224, 1265–66 (2012) [hereinafter Angry Judges]. 
 54.  See Blumenthal, supra note 22, at 190–91 (noting research on anticipatory emotions). 
 55.  See Luigi Leone et al., Emotions and Decision Making: Regulatory Focus Moderates the 
Influence of Anticipated Emotions on Action Evaluations, 19 COGNITION & EMOTION 1175, 1177 
(2005). 
 56.  See Blumenthal, supra note 22, at 204. 
 57.  Id. at 197. 
 58.  See, e.g., Neal Feigenson, Emotional Influences on Judgments of Legal Blame, in EMOTION 
AND THE LAW: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 89 (Brian H. Bornstein & Richard L. Wiener 
eds., 2011) (worrying that “gauging the effects of particular emotions, from particular sources, on 
ultimate judgments” may be “highly, perhaps impossibly, complex”); see also Toni M. Massaro, 
Show (Some) Emotions, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 80, 104 (Susan A. Bandes ed.,1999) (urging that 
we “should be extremely wary of any reform based on an assumption that legal rules or public 
officials can and should manipulate particular emotions to produce predictable behavioral 
responses,” in critiquing proposals for shaming punishments in criminal cases). 
SPOTTSWOOD FINAL 11/11/2014  9:49 AM 
54 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 63 
Other voices in this new wave of law and emotions scholarship take 
a more optimistic view, and have tried to capture some of the 
complexities revealed by the psychological research and apply it to legal 
problems.  One important line of thinking has emphasized the complex 
and dynamic interactions that may occur between factual judgments and 
emotional feelings during a trial.  In both the traditional and the Humean 
models of emotion at trial, there is a relatively straightforward chain of 
causation at work: A fact-finder hears the evidence and decides what 
they believe occurred.  They then react emotionally to their vision of the 
facts (and possibly to other, “incidental” factors as well), and that 
emotional reaction may affect their verdict decisions, either for the better 
(in the Humean account) or for the worse (in the classical model). 
Neal Feigenson has suggested that this picture is far too simple, 
because “emotional feelings influence which facts decision-makers will 
attend to, how much time they will spend poring over them, and how 
they will interpret and categorize them.”59  This does not necessarily lead 
to poor decision-making, because feelings may be aroused in an 
appropriate way based on evidence and may therefore focus factual 
reasoning in a helpful way.  Despite this positive potential, the role of 
emotion in factual reasoning also has a number of potential downsides.  
First, if emotion is aroused by purely incidental factors, any effect it has 
is unlikely to promote accurate verdicts.60  Second, we may feel emotions 
for case-specific reasons that are nevertheless unjustifiable, such as a 
party’s “similarity to the observer” or mere “likeability,” which might 
undermine both the accuracy of verdicts and the system’s ability to treat 
litigants as equally as possible.61  Thus, we see a murkier picture than 
was presented by the earlier models: Emotion does not merely alter what 
we want to do given the facts of a case, but it may also change our 
perceptions of the facts themselves.  Feigenson therefore concludes that 
the law’s distrust of arguments to sympathy “seems to get it right,” but 
worries that sympathy’s effects “may vary depending on the type of the 
case,” making it risky to offer any “unequivocal conclusions.”62  Other 
                                                          
 59.  Feigenson, supra note 34, at 62. 
 60.  See, e.g., Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and the 
Psychology of Blame, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 255, 281–282 (2012) (showing that positive or negative 
character evaluations tended to bias purely factual judgments on completely unrelated 
characteristics, such as the extent to which an individual’s conduct was a cause-in-fact of resulting 
harm). 
 61.  See Feigenson, supra note 34, at 53–55, 64. 
 62.  Id. at 78. 
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theorists agree that emotions will shape factual construal during the trial 
itself, but focus more on the ways that emotions might help make 
decision-making more accurate.63 
Terry Maroney has added another layer of nuance by emphasizing 
that decision-makers have a broader set of options than either 
suppressing their feelings or letting them take over.  In a series of 
articles, Maroney has explored two closely related questions.  First, how 
might judges distinguish between the positive and negative effects of 
emotion on their own thinking?64  And second, how should judges 
respond when they feel that they are likely to be influenced in a negative 
way by a strong feeling?65  On the former question, she sees great value 
in the kind of feelings that are rationally rooted in evidence and that 
dispose a decision-maker to take appropriate action.66  On the latter 
question, she has urged that, even when they are faced with emotions that 
are likely to have negative impacts on their judgment, judges will reach 
better decisions by acknowledging those feelings and engaging in active 
management strategies than by trying to suppress them.67  At least if 
decision-makers have the training and willingness to cooperate, 
Maroney’s model offers us some hope of obtaining some benefits from 
emotional influences on cognition while avoiding its downsides.68 
Finally, Reid Hastie has likewise endorsed a view that emphasizes 
the utility of emotions engendered by trial stimuli.  He articulates a 
dichotomy between “incidental emotions” that are caused by factors 
outside the trial process, such as grief following the death of a family 
                                                          
 63.  See Brown, supra note 9, at 47, 49, 94–95 (explaining that tasks such as credibility 
evaluation require more “than merely calculating others’ feelings . . . but rather involve[] the 
triggering of an appropriate emotional response in the observer”); Todd Pettys, The Emotional Juror, 
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1609, 1626–29 (2007) (similarly emphasizing the importance of emotion in 
credibility determinations, but focusing instead on its power to mark particular demeanor cues with 
special salience). 
 64.  See, e.g., Angry Judges, supra note 53, at 1249–71 (offering a set of criteria for judges to 
use in distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate anger). 
 65.  See id. at 1272–82 (discussing judicial anger management techniques); see also Terry A. 
Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1485, 1509–28 (2011) 
[hereinafter Emotional Regulation]  (exploring ways that judges can mitigate strong feelings more 
broadly). 
 66.  Angry Judges, supra note 53, at 1250–64. 
 67.  Emotional Regulation, supra note 65, at 1509–28. 
 68.  Maroney has engaged in an admirable effort in this direction, through her participation in 
recent training programs for federal judges.  See Terry Maroney to Present at Orientation Program 
for New Federal Judges, Faculty News, VANDERBILT LAW SCHOOL (Feb. 4, 2013), 
http://law.vanderbilt.edu/news/terry-maroney-to-present-at-orientation-program-for-new-federal-
judges/. 
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member, and “decision-relevant emotions” that arise due to features of 
the case itself.69  Hastie quickly concedes that, if incidental emotions are 
influencing the outcome of cases, such effects are “certainly detrimental” 
to the proper goals of the trial process.70  But he is ambivalent, rather 
than overtly critical, regarding the influence of decision-relevant 
emotions.  For instance, he acknowledges reports that many jurors find 
their task to be stressful, but then emphasizes that moderate levels of 
stress may promote “the most effective, adaptive levels of 
performance.”71  Similarly, he discusses in detail the possibility that 
jurors will be guided in their determinations by “anticipated emotions,” 
meaning their expectations regarding the way that different possible 
outcomes will make them feel.72  Thus, if the evidence regarding a 
party’s conduct makes a juror angry, that juror may feel a desire to 
punish that party, while evidence that provided a basis for sympathy 
might lead to lenience.73  In both cases, such decisions would be a way 
for jurors to obtain “relief from the current somewhat negative emotional 
state.”74  But except in the “rare” cases involving “sparse” or “inchoate” 
evidence, where Hastie worries that emotions will take the place of 
rational comparisons between the parties’ stories, he declines to offer 
guidance as to when emotional influences are likely to be veridical and 
when they are likely to undermine trial judgment.75 
The existing landscape, therefore, can be summarized as follows.  
The still-dominant classical view, which is employed by most judges and 
lawyers, as well as by some in the academy, characterizes emotions as a 
corrosive force, which is destructive of good trial inference.  A 
countervailing group of theorists take the opposing, Humean position, 
arguing that excluding or limiting emotional engagement tends to 
corrode the system’s ability to render just verdicts, primarily by blinding 
judges or jurors to the human costs of their decisions.  Finally, an 
emerging tradition seeks a more nuanced synthesis between these 
extremes.  Writers in this new group focus on the complex interactions 
between emotions and cognition, and emphasize that the costs and 
benefits of emotional arousal vary situationally, depending on the issues, 
                                                          
 69.  Reid Hastie, Emotions in Jurors’ Decisions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 991, 100104 (2001). 
 70.  Id. at 1002. 
 71.  Id. at 1003. 
 72.  Id. at 1004–05. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 1006. 
 75.  Id. at 1009. 
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individuals, and specific emotions at play.  Although these scholars focus 
their attention on a variety of questions, they broadly agree on the 
following points: (1) excising emotion from trial inference is not 
realistically achievable, (2) emotions often function adaptively to 
facilitate accurate judgments in the trial context, and (3) despite these 
adaptive functions, some kinds of emotional arousal, either based on 
incidental factors or arising out of trial stimuli, may nevertheless be 
problematic.  Despite their incorporation of modern psychological 
insights, however, these writers have not tended to use their research as a 
platform for concrete and implementable law reform proposals. 
III. A DUAL PROCESS FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF 
EMOTIONS IN FACT-FINDING 
Like other scholars who have rejected both the Classical and the 
Humean views of emotion, I will argue that emotions can sometimes 
further, and sometimes obstruct, accurate decision-making at trial.  
However, in order to make this basic insight more concrete, and enable 
us to make some fairly reliable predictions about what effects a particular 
emotion might have within the trial process, I will first provide a 
descriptive account of the roles that emotion can play as jurors listen to 
individual pieces of trial evidence over time, and then combine to 
deliberate regarding the appropriate verdict.  This account will draw on 
the dual-process tradition in cognitive psychology research, which 
isolates and separately analyzes two different kinds of thought processes: 
a fast, unconscious, and automatic “System 1” and a slower, more 
effortful “System 2.”  In previous work, I have relied on this research to 
articulate a dual-process model of evidential inference.76  In this section, 
I will elaborate and extend upon that model to account for the 
interactions between evidence items, emotional arousal, and factual 
judgments at trial. 
Before I proceed any further, I must pause briefly to give a few 
words of caution regarding the theory I am about to develop.  Initially, I 
must emphasize that the basic account I will be developing here is 
intended to be descriptive, rather than normative, in nature.  It will be 
much easier to identify meaningful reform proposals if we separate out 
two questions: What effects do emotions have on fact-finding judgments, 
and (of those effects) which ones do we approve of and which ones 
                                                          
 76.  See generally Hidden Structure, supra note 19; Bridging the Gap, supra note 19. 
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trouble us?  The first category of questions is descriptive, and relies 
primarily on psychological data and theory.  The second category is 
normative in nature, and will require a different set of tools, including 
both epistemic theorizing about what forms of inference maximize the 
reliability of judgments, and consideration of what other values, besides 
accuracy, we wish to maximize in the trial process.  For clarity, I will 
reserve the normative questions until after the basic descriptive model 
has been elaborated. 
I must also stress the distinction between a theory of emotion at trial 
and the reality of such things.  As I discussed above, one of the 
challenges that modern law and emotions scholarship faces is that the 
points of clear agreement often get lost in a thicket of details.  For the 
sake of analyzing the efficacy of legal rules and evaluating potential 
improvements to them, it may be more helpful to propose general rules 
that are approximately right than to posit theories so nuanced that they 
cannot be conveniently summarized.  In pursuing a course like this, of 
course, we run the risk that some simplifications may turn out to be 
problematic, either because the general theory makes small errors in a 
large number of cases or because it fails spectacularly in some narrow 
and unanticipated area.  Likewise, to the extent we rely on psychological 
data as a basis for theorizing, there is always a risk that some new and 
radical paradigm shift will pull the rug out from under our feet.77  But 
both of these challenges can be made manageable so long as we are 
suitably modest and mindful of the inherent limits of our task: To the 
extent at all possible, we will do best if we limit ourselves to relying on 
well-confirmed theories that rest on a large body of experimental 
evidence, if we avoid taking sides in active psychological controversies, 
and if we are wary of extrapolating experimental results too far from the 
domain in which they have been developed.78  With these caveats in 
mind, then, I will develop a theory of how emotions are likely to function 
at trial. 
A. An Introduction to Dual-Process Models of Cognition 
Dual-process models were developed by psychologists and 
neuroscientists in an attempt to explain certain features of human 
                                                          
 77.  Cf. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 1222, 10203 (3d 
ed. 1996). 
 78.  See Kathryn Zeiler, Cautions on the Use of Economics Experiments in Law, 166 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 178, 184–88 (2010). 
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thinking, based both on numerous experiments and on reflective 
consideration regarding the nature of cognition.  Initially, such theories 
were developed as a way to explain the patterns of errors that participants 
in experiments would make on certain kinds of tasks, which would 
disappear when participants were encouraged to slow down and reason 
carefully.79  One common theory regarding such mistakes is that they 
revealed our use of two different kinds of reasoning systems: a 
“heuristic” system, which applied simple rules that would sometimes be 
helpful and sometimes lead us astray, and an “analytic” system, which 
could perform more complicated modes of reasoning and restrain the 
errors of the first system when activated.80  Over time, however, this 
simple model has been complicated by data showing that sometimes, the 
quick, intuitive answer to a problem is remarkably accurate, and that 
reasoning more analytically does not always lead us to better decisions.81  
As a result, the modern approach to describing these systems uses more 
neutral language that does not privilege either form of cognition: The 
quick, intuitive form of problem solving is labeled as a group of “Type 1 
processes,” which we collectively can label as “System 1,” while the 
slower, more deliberative kind of reasoning involves “Type 2 processes” 
that we can label as “System 2.”82  Thus, each “System” comprises a 
family of related modes of thinking and problem solving, with common 
characteristics, which sometimes work in relative independence of one 
another and at other times work in tandem.83 
                                                          
 79.  See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Heuristics and Biases: Judgment Under 
Uncertainty, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1130–31 (1974) (describing three such patterns: the 
representativeness heuristic, the availability heuristic, and the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic). 
 80.  See, e.g., Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Heuristic and Analytic Processes in Reasoning, 75 BRIT. 
J. PSYCHOL. 451 (1984). 
 81.  See generally GERD GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING: RATIONALITY IN THE REAL 
WORLD 16698 (2002) (providing data and theory in support of the idea that, on the many everyday 
tasks in which we face both limited time and limited information when solving a problem, simple 
heuristic solutions can outperform more detailed and systematic thinking). 
 82.  See KAHNEMAN, supra note 14, at 20–21 (outlining the two types of reasoning); Peter 
Carruthers, An Architecture for Dual Reasoning, in IN TWO MINDS: DUAL PROCESSES & BEYOND 
109, 109112 (Jonathan St. B. T. Evans & Keith Frankish eds., 2009); Keith Frankish, Systems and 
Levels: Dual-System Theories and the Personal-Subpersonal Distinction, in IN TWO MINDS: DUAL 
PROCESSES AND BEYOND 89, 96102 (Jonathan St. B. T. Evans & Keith Frankish eds., 2009); see 
also Keith Frankish & Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, The Duality of Mind: A Historical Perspective, in 
IN TWO MINDS: DUAL PROCESSES & BEYOND 15–18 (2008) (tracing the origin of the “System 
1/System 2” locution to KEITH E. STANOVICH, WHO IS RATIONAL?: STUDIES OF INDIVIDUAL 
DIFFERENCES IN REASONING (1999)); JONATHAN ST. B.T. EVANS & DAVID E. OVER, RATIONALITY 
AND REASONING 141–146 (1996) (providing an early use of the “dual systems” terminology). 
 83.  See KAHNEMAN, supra note 14, at 22–29. 
SPOTTSWOOD FINAL 11/11/2014  9:49 AM 
60 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 63 
System 1 comprises the domain of fast, automatic cognition.  We use 
this form of reasoning constantly, usually without realizing that we are 
doing any thinking at all.  When you recognize a familiar face, read a 
sentence in a language you speak fluently, or step on your brakes when 
you notice a car slowing ahead of you in traffic, you probably do not 
perceive any process of analyzing a problem and choosing an appropriate 
answer or response.  Rather, you just know, without knowing how you 
know it, that the face is familiar, that the words comprise a recipe for 
quiche, and that you had better slow down before an accident occurs.  It 
is easy to conclude that this sort of thinking is only used for “easy” 
problems, but that belies both the computational complexity of the 
challenges involved,84 as well as the fact that even “expert” skills can 
become fluid and automatic with sufficient practice.85  What ties these 
mental activities together, therefore, is not that they are “easy” problems 
in any computational sense, but that they feel easy because we do not 
perceive the cognitive labor involved in obtaining the answers. 
System 2, by contrast, is the domain of slow, effortful thinking.  If 
you try to compute the sum of 378 and 533 in your head, you will 
probably notice that this task feels nothing like the System 1 processes 
discussed in the preceding paragraph.  First of all, you will find that you 
need to focus your attention in order to complete the task; if you become 
distracted, you will not arrive at an answer at all.86  Second, you will find 
that completing the task seems to require mental effort; the more tired 
you are, the harder you will find it to finish, and the more readily you 
will seize on an excuse not to do it at all.87  Third, you will also notice 
that you experience internal awareness of the steps involved in 
                                                          
 84.  All of these tasks have bedeviled researchers in computer science, who have labored 
mightily to design machines that can do what people find intuitive and easy.  See, e.g., Navin 
Prakash et al., Emerging Trends of Face Recognition: A Review, 2 WORLD APPLIED PROGRAMMING 
242, 244–45 (2011) (describing the challenges that have complicated the design of effective facial 
recognition software, such as the difficulty of writing code that can accommodate variations in 
lighting and position). 
 85.  KAHNEMAN, supra note 14, at 240–42 (describing the conditions under which experts can 
acquire highly accurate intuitions regarding complex problems). 
 86.   Id. at 2223. 
 87.  See Martin S. Hagger et al., Ego Depletion and the Strength Model of Self-Control: A 
Meta-Analysis, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 495, 496 (2010); E.J. Masicampo & Roy F. Baumeister, 
Toward a Physiology of Dual-Process Reasoning and Judgment: Lemonade, Willpower, and 
Expensive Rule-Based Analysis, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 255, 25960 (2008) (noting the “expensive and 
effortful” nature of System 2 reasoning); see generally Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Crime, 
Punishment, and the Psychology of Self-Control, 61 EMORY L.J. 501, 53843 (2012) (reviewing 
literature on the strength model of self-control). 
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computing the answer.88  You might visualize the images of the numbers 
you are manipulating in your mind’s eye, or perhaps you might “think 
aloud” and hear yourself working out the steps of the summation.  This 
indicates that you are holding information in your working memory 
systems and manipulating it consciously.  It is important to note that 
these three features often go together: We frequently find that some 
mental tasks require focused attention, feel effortful, and require 
conscious contemplation to complete.  When these features are present, 
we say that we are engaging in Type 2, rather than Type 1, modes of 
thinking. 
One key insight of dual-process theory is that these two systems 
sometimes generate different answers to problems.  We have all, no 
doubt, found ourselves in situations where we tend automatically towards 
one action or conclusion, but find ourselves expending effort in order to 
reach a different outcome.89  Dual-process theory predicts (based on 
experimental data) two important features of such conflicts.  First, 
because System 1 cognition is automatic and effortless, while System 2 
cognition requires work, you will tend to follow the System 1 response 
unless you focus your attention on the task in an active way and exercise 
self-control.90  But simply activating a System 2 process does not 
guarantee that we will resist a System 1 impulse or intuition.  System 1 
plays a role in selecting the arguments we will consider, and shapes how 
we will feel about different conclusions, leading us naturally into 
patterns of motivated reasoning.  When this occurs, we use our conscious 
cognitive resources, not to deduce an abstract answer to a problem, but 
rather to justify the answer that already feels right—sometimes without 
                                                          
 88.  See Frankish, supra note 82, at 9293; EVANS & OVER, supra note 82, at 154. 
 89.  I experience the feeling regularly when trying to resist the urge to eat all the cookies I find 
within my reach, an urge that persists even when I do not feel hungry and have no earthly need for 
more calories.  But if that does not strike a chord with you, you might try focusing on the period at 
the end of this footnote for as long as you can.  Your automatic impulse will no doubt be to turn 
away towards more interesting tasks, but you can, through the exercise of conscious processes of 
self-control, fix your attention in one spot.  The discomfort you will feel as you try and resist your 
own intuitive impulses will illustrate the internal experience of a dual-system conflict. 
 90.  See KAHNEMAN, supra note 14, at 22–24 (noting that System 2 will function “less well, or 
not at all” when a person is inattentive); Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, A Model of Heuristic 
Judgment, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING 267, 279–80 (noting that 
variations in attentiveness correlate with success on reasoning problems that demand System 2 
involvement); STANOVICH, supra note 82, at 110–11 (discussing the role of willpower in “override 
failures,” in which System 2 fails to inhibit an automatic but incorrect or undesirable System 1 
response). 
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even realizing that we are doing so!91  As a result, when our intuition is 
likely to steer us wrong, deliberative, System 2 thinking can only save us 
if we are motivated to use it in a way that resists our automatic impulses. 
As I have argued previously,92 this model provides an excellent 
foundation for analyzing the ways that judges and juries use evidence 
when deciding cases.  A few points are worth noting.  First, during the 
trial itself, a substantial amount of information processing likely occurs 
automatically, at the System 1 level, because judges and juries typically 
assume a relatively passive role as evidence is presented during an 
adversarial trial.93  System 2 likely plays a role in keeping jurors focused 
on the evidence and avoiding distracting thoughts, but beyond that it 
seems unlikely that most judges or juries spend a majority of their time 
during trial thinking about the evidence in an active, conscious way.94 
Instead, what mostly occurs during this phase is that the fact-finders 
are exposed to a deluge of information, some of which is retained as 
explicit memories, but far more of which is processed in a primarily 
implicit manner.  System 1 has a powerful capacity for learning and then 
recognizing patterns, so that when we encounter things together in our 
lives, we learn to expect them to co-occur in the future.95  Indeed, many 
of the seemingly miraculous computational feats of System 1 can be 
explained in terms of such pattern-learning and pattern-recognizing 
abilities.96  What this implies is that, as the trial goes on, new evidence 
items and concepts that arise during the trial are integrated into a pre-
existing associative network, forming an implicit model of the case.  This 
                                                          
 91.  See Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist 
Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 818 (2001); see generally Richard E. Nisbett 
& Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental 
Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231 (1977) (collecting many examples of unconsciously confabulated 
explanations of associatively determined behaviors). 
 92.  See Hidden Structure, supra note 19, at 171–93. 
 93.  See id. at 171–72 (hypothesizing that during a trial, System 2 involvement is primarily 
directed to maintaining focus on the evidence items “because of the largely passive nature of the jury 
and judicial instructions encouraging them to refrain from decision until the parties have finished 
presenting their cases”). 
 94.  See id. at 172, 188. 
 95.  See KAHNEMAN, supra note 14, at 114–17 (discussing our innate tendency to search for 
patterns in data); HOWARD MARGOLIS, PATTERNS, THINKING, AND COGNITION: A THEORY OF 
JUDGMENT 39–41 (1987) (describing our automatic tendencies to engage in “pattern-seeking, 
pattern-dominated cognition”). 
 96.  See KAHNEMAN, supra note 14, at 240–42 (describing the use of pattern learning to solve 
complex problems in areas such as chess, clinical psychology, and medicine); see also GIGERENZER, 
supra note 21, at 107–33 (describing scenarios in which recognition-driven heuristics can 
outperform more analytic modes of thinking in making inferences). 
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model, in turn, creates intuitive feelings regarding what case-related 
events transpired in the past and who is responsible for them.  
Importantly, however, System 1 does not tend to discriminate very much 
between relevant and irrelevant inputs; rather, it processes all of our 
sensory data in the same, systematic way regardless of how we would 
analyze it at a more rational or deliberative level.  This can lead us to 
have intuitions about case outcomes that would be hard to defend in the 
abstract. 
Once the evidence-presentation phase of a trial has ended, System 2 
takes on a more active role, as judges write opinions and juries deliberate 
towards a verdict.  At this point, several different things may occur.  
First, by reasoning in a systematic and conscious way, fact-finders may 
realize that their intuitions about a case are misguided, leading them to 
reach a result different than what System 1 would have generated on its 
own.  But in many cases, deliberative reasoning may be used, either 
knowingly or unconsciously, to justify the results that “feel right,” in a 
manner that is biased towards defending a System 1 conclusion rather 
than resisting it.  As a result, when a trial environment presents stimuli 
that are likely to create problematic intuitions, we must be cautious 
before we assume that deliberation alone will resolve the problem.  
Indeed, it is often possible to observe outcomes that are very hard to 
defend analytically, despite the fact that those outcomes were produced 
by substantial deliberation and analysis.97 
B. Integrating Emotional Influences Within a Dual-Process Framework 
In addition to its other attractive properties, a dual-process model of 
trial decision-making provides a natural way to conceptualize the roles 
that emotions play in shaping a jury’s verdict choices.  The model 
predicts that emotions, when aroused, will influence a fact-finder’s 
decisions in multiple ways: They will shape the kinds of associations that 
our fact-finder will form in response to testimony, they will help direct 
the focus of her attention among competing possible candidates for 
                                                          
 97.  See Hidden Structure, supra note 19, at 188–193 (describing the ways that a jury might 
have employed System 2 resources to find a man guilty of raping and murdering a young girl despite 
the admission of exonerating DNA evidence in the same case); see also Lisa Kern Griffin, 
Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 311–312 (2013) (discussing a jury’s decision, after 
lengthy deliberations, to convict Mark Jensen of murdering his wife based on fairly weak and 
circumstantial evidence, as an example of a circumstance where narrativist reasoning can allow a 
jury to “make events appear more linear than they are”). 
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consideration, and they will ultimately shape the attractiveness of 
competing stories when she reasons actively about the case.  Emotions, 
in other words, shape both System 1 and System 2 cognitive processes 
during trials.  Furthermore, the model situates itself among other 
contextual approaches, in that it neither rigidly condemns all emotional 
influences, like the classical framework, nor uncritically encourages 
them, as in the Humean account.  Rather, emotions will sometimes help 
our fact-finder reach accurate decisions and at other times they will 
undermine that goal, depending on her background experiences, on the 
mode and manner in which evidence is presented to her, and on the 
extent to which she is motivated to either give in to or resist her 
impulses. 
1. What Are Emotions? 
Before proceeding further, it may help to clarify a question that lurks 
in the background of this discussion: What, precisely, is an emotion?  On 
one level, the answer to this question may seem obvious—we have all 
felt emotions before and can all relate to some aspects of what that 
experience is like.  At the same time, deeper reflection shows that 
emotions are highly complex states of affairs, some aspects of which are 
transparent to introspection and some of which hide from our internal 
perception.  Some felt emotions may correspond cleanly to the labels 
employed in everyday conversation, but this will not always be the 
case.98  Emotional states exist at a crossroads between our bodies and our 
minds, and mediate between our perceptions, our knowledge of the 
world, and our goals. 
Prototypical emotional experiences combine a number of features 
together.99  First, emotions resemble other kinds of mental activity, in 
that they involve measurable changes in neural activity that arise in 
response to particular kinds of stimuli.100  For instance, if I were to 
encounter a snake while walking in the woods, specific patterns of neural 
activity would arise in a predictable way: Signals from my optic nerves, 
                                                          
 98.  See JEROME KAGAN, WHAT IS EMOTION?: HISTORY, MEASURES, AND MEANINGS 112–13 
(2007) (noting that English-language folk labels for emotional states fail to account for the 
subjective experience of “emotional blends” and also do not neatly track the underlying biological 
states that are a central part of emotional experience). 
 99.  See id. at 23 (elaborating a model of emotions that combines brain states, changes in 
feeling with “sensory qualities,” cognitive processes that interpret and label those feelings, and 
“preparedness for, or display of, a behavioral response”). 
 100.  Id. at 23–24. 
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which represent the basic size and shape of the snake, would be passed 
simultaneously to both my amygdala and to my visual cortex.  While the 
cortical regions were analyzing the stimulus, eventually prompting a 
conscious perception of a snake-shaped object, the amygdala would be 
swiftly passing activation on to areas of the brain that tend to freeze my 
muscles, lower my heart rate, redirect blood-flow away from processes 
like digestion, and release cortisol, a stress hormone, into my 
bloodstream.101  This pattern of neural activation represents some part of 
the emotion we call fear: Triggering the amygdala with a small shock 
will generate some of these responses even in the absence of snakes or 
other fearful stimuli, while brain damage to the amygdala would inhibit 
those arousal patterns even in the presence of frightening displays.102  In 
other words, we can say both that someone who feels afraid probably has 
an unusually active amygdala at that point in time, and that in the 
absence of such activity, that person would not feel as afraid.  Clearly, 
then, we can identify increases in neural activity in particular brain 
regions as one important correlate of emotional responses.103 
Next, another core component of emotions involves subjective 
experience; regardless of what brain areas are involved, we all know that 
fear feels a certain way, and we can recognize that state when we are in 
it.104  What is notable about the subjective experience of emotion, on 
reflection, is that although we think of emotions as mental states, much 
of what we are “feeling” when our emotions are aroused are changes 
occurring in our bodies.  Thus, when I see the snake I will likely feel an 
increase in my heartbeat and breathing rate, tightness in my stomach, and 
dryness in my mouth.  In fact, experiencing such bodily states is an 
important part of what it means to feel afraid.105 
                                                          
 101.  See LEDOUX, supra note 26, at 159–69; John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The Evolutionary 
Psychology of the Emotions and Their Relationship to Internal Regulatory Variables, in HANDBOOK 
OF EMOTIONS 114, 118–19 (Michael Lewis et al. eds., 3d ed. 2010). 
 102.  LEDOUX, supra note 26, at 298. 
 103.  See DAMASIO, supra note 21, at 139–42. 
 104.  See KAGAN, supra note 98, at 42–50 (discussing how sensations contribute to a detected 
feeling). 
 105.  LEDOUX, supra note 26, at 132–33.  Some theorists have placed this experience at the 
center of what it means to experience emotion.  William James famously proposed that there was no 
“mind-stuff” involved in emotional experience aside from perceptions of our bodies’ responses to 
stimuli.  William James, What Is An Emotion, 9 MIND 188, 193 (1884).  More recently, Antonio 
Damasio has argued, on the basis of studies of people with particular forms of brain damage, that 
perceiving the states of our bodies is a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for emotional 
experience.  In what he calls the “somatic-marker hypothesis,” he argues that when particular 
experiences tend to be associated with good or bad consequences, emotional feelings become 
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This leads us to the third crucial component of emotional experience, 
which is a cognitive appraisal connecting our feelings with some facts 
about the world.  What our brains are doing, and how we feel in an 
experiential sense, can be analyzed in different ways depending on the 
context in which we find ourselves, and thus the labels we ascribe to 
feelings can help shape our experience of them.106  For instance, we 
ascribe valence to emotional experiences, construing some of them as 
positive and others as negative.107  As a result, the way we frame an 
affective experience can shape the way we label it.108  Thus, both the 
experience of meeting a threatening stranger in a dark alley and the 
experience of sitting in a roller-coaster car as it slowly ascends towards a 
speedy descent would likely affect me very similarly at both the neural 
and somatic levels: Just as when I saw the snake, such experiences would 
likely cause my pulse to race and my gut to tighten, mediated by 
increased neural firing in my amygdala.  But because of the differing 
contexts, I would likely construe the first experience as terror, and the 
second experience as pleasurable excitement.  Similarly, we might 
experience a slowed pulse, feelings of physical fatigue, and low levels of 
stress in different ways depending on the context: If we had just sat down 
in an arm-chair after a long day at work, we might construe the 
experience positively, as a form of contentment, whereas if we felt the 
same way in the middle of our day off we might see the same state as a 
mild depression.  What this means is that our emotional experiences are 
shaped by our beliefs and expectations regarding what it is appropriate to 
feel in a particular context, in addition to brute physical facts about our 
bodily states. 
The fourth and final ingredient in core emotional experiences is an 
action tendency.  One distinguishing feature of emotional experiences is 
that they tend to be associated with particular impulses to act, or not act.  
Take, for instance, the closely related emotions of fear and anger: Both 
involve heightened arousal, muscular tension, and are experienced as 
unpleasant in most situations.  However, they differ importantly in terms 
of their associated action tendency.  Fear encourages us to freeze and 
                                                          
associated with recurrences of those or similar events, and help guide our choices by “highlighting” 
these options as deserving special attention.  DAMASIO, supra note 21, at 173–74. 
 106.  See KAGAN, supra note 98, at 44–45. 
 107.  Paula M. Niedenthal, Emotion Concepts, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS, supra note 101, at 
587. 
 108.  See id. (noting that emotion concepts are “fundamental to the development of an 
individual’s behavioral repertoire”). 
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then seek to flee (physically or metaphorically) from the object that 
aroused its sensations, while anger inspires us to approach its object and 
do battle.  Likewise, construing a calm, low-arousal state as contentment 
would lead us to be open towards others and to new experiences, while 
experiencing the same state as depression might incline us towards 
avoidance instead.109  Of course, such impulses are not inevitably 
followed.  We often overcome our fears, repress our rage, and break out 
of depressions through a combination of emotional self-regulation and 
the exercise of willpower.  That is why these are labeled as action 
tendencies rather than as inevitabilities. 
Finally, it is important to note that these action tendencies can extend 
out of the domain of decisions about what to do, and have effects on how 
we think as well.  For instance, when we are afraid, we will be faster to 
notice and identify threats, and we will be more likely to construe 
ambiguous stimuli as threatening.110  More generally, experiencing an 
emotion will tend to focus our attention on matters that are congruent 
with that state, and will also shape our perceptions of ambiguous stimuli.  
As a result, people who are already afraid will be more likely to both 
notice dangerous things and to construe safe things as dangerous,111 just 
as people who are currently enraged will easily notice rudeness in others 
and may see rudeness even where none was intended.112  Furthermore, 
these effects will persist into the future, because increasing the salience 
of information in our environment will also shape which facts in our 
environment we commit to memory.113  As a result, changing our 
                                                          
 109.  Margaret E. Kemeny & Avgusta Shestyuk, Emotions, the Neuroendocrine and Immune 
Systems, and Health, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS, supra note 101, at 661, 666–67 (discussing the 
association between depression and behavioral disengagement). 
 110.  Arne Öhman, Fear and Anxiety: Overlaps and Dissociations, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS, 
supra note 101, at 709, 715–17. 
 111.  Cf. Joseph P. Forgas, Affect in Legal and Forensic Settings: The Cognitive Benefits of Not 
Being Too Happy, in EMOTION AND THE LAW: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, at 13, 33–36 (Brian 
H. Bornstein & Richard L. Wiener eds., 2009) (describing experiments in which participants were 
asked to make “shoot/don’t shoot” decisions based on brief exposures to photographs, based on 
whether the person in the photo was holding a gun or some other object, and documenting a higher 
rate of mistaken “shoot” decisions when a black or Muslim person was pictured). 
 112.  See Angry Judges, supra note 53, at 1226–27 (discussing the impact of anger on judges, 
including its tendency to “shorten[]” a judge’s “fuse,” making it more likely that the judge will react 
negatively to provocations by the parties before her).  Cf. Tooby & Cosmides, supra note 101, at 
131–32 (discussing the functional role of anger as a means of encouraging us to defend ourselves 
from threats to our welfare by inflicting costs on other, weaker individuals who compete with us for 
valuable resources). 
 113.  See Pettys, supra note 63, at 1632–36 (discussing the impact of salience on two 
hypothetical jurors); Elizabeth A. Kensinger & Daniel L. Schacter, Memory and Emotion, in 
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emotional states will change the facts we see, hear, and remember, even 
if we are exposed to otherwise identical information.  For the purpose of 
a theory of fact-finding, such cognitive influences of emotion must take 
center stage. 
2. Emotional Influences in Dual-Process Fact-Finding 
Emotional states, therefore, are best understood as a mix of 
neurological patterns, bodily feelings and sensations, cognitive 
appraisals, and tendencies to act and think in particular ways.114  With 
this clarified picture in hand, we can now consider how emotions are 
likely to shape and modify judge and jury reasoning, as seen through the 
lens of the dual-process model.  The dual-process model allows emotions 
to play a role at multiple levels: By activating particular branches in our 
System 1 associative networks, emotions will naturally shape which 
evidence items a juror notices, how ambiguous evidence is construed, 
and which items of evidence form durable memory traces, even if a juror 
is not consciously focused on the emotion or aware of such effects.115  
During the evidence-presentation phase of the trial, emotions will also 
play a role at the level of System 2, by making it either easier or harder 
for jurors to steadily maintain their focus on the evidence items being 
presented.116  Later, at the deliberation phase, both felt and anticipated 
emotions will shape the balance between intuitive and deliberative 
reasoning.117  Emotions will also shape which evidence items are easy to 
recall and which fade from attention during the deliberation process.118  
Finally, emotions will play a special role at this stage by encouraging 
motivated reasoning, based on the feelings of cognitive dissonance that 
arise when we try to consciously resist our intuitive judgments.119 
                                                          
HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS, supra note 101, at 601, 602–04 (noting that positive and negative events 
are more likely to be recognized than neutral ones). 
 114.  See KAGAN, supra note 98, at 42–50. 
 115.  See Feigenson, supra note 34, at 61 (asserting that “emotional feelings influence which 
facts decision-makers will attend to, how much time they will spend poring over them, and how they 
will interpret and categorize them”). 
 116.  See Emotional Regulation, supra note 65, at 1507. 
 117.  See Forgas, supra note 111, at 20–21 (discussing the influence of differing moods on 
information-processing styles). 
 118.  See Pettys, supra note 63, at 1632–36 (asserting that “evidence-triggered emotions will 
exert a powerful influence on the narrative options that the jurors construct and evaluate”); 
Kensinger & Schacter, supra note 113, at 601, 602 (describing how individuals often remember 
more emotional events than nonemotional ones). 
 119.  See KAHNEMAN, supra note 14, at 103 (noting that “the dominance of conclusions over 
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We would expect that emotions could be aroused by a wide array of 
factors, some of which we think of as evidence and some of which we 
would consider entirely irrelevant to the goals of the trial process.  
Consider, for instance, a juror who was feeling angry while listening to a 
particular piece of testimony.  First, that anger might be aroused in a way 
that is closely tied to the informational content of the witness’s 
testimony.  If, for instance, the witness testified that he witnessed the 
defendant harming his child, anger would be a natural response on the 
part of a listener.  But many other things besides evidence might give rise 
to a similar feeling.  Perhaps the juror is getting annoyed with a lawyer 
who is objecting to questions that the juror would like to hear answered; 
alternatively, the juror might be frustrated by the fact that the trial is 
taking a long time, and focus his anger on the person of the judge who is 
regulating the proceedings.  Such emotions would be aroused by features 
of the case, but not by the evidence itself.  Finally, jurors might 
experience emotions that have nothing at all to do with the case itself.  
Thus, our juror might be angry because of a fight he had with his wife 
that morning, or because the testimony reminded him of an unpleasant 
childhood experience.  In short, fact-finders will naturally experience 
emotional responses to the evidence, to non-evidential features of the 
trial process, and to entirely extraneous events. 
The dual-process approach, unlike previous approaches to modeling 
trial inference, helps us articulate the ways that these emotions are likely 
to influence a juror’s thinking about the case.  We can and should 
distinguish between the ways that emotions impact System 1 and System 
2 reasoning.  First, let us consider the System 1 effects.  Recall that 
System 1 is relatively undiscriminating in its use of inputs; it tends to 
incorporate everything we sense into its general-purpose, pattern-
detection approach to problem solving, and to nudge us towards 
judgments and decisions that were associated with similar patterns in the 
past.120  When we model System 1 in this way, we would expect that our 
own emotions would be just another piece of data to be included as 
                                                          
arguments is most pronounced where emotions are involved”). 
 120.  See KAHNEMAN, supra note 14, at 50–58; WILSON, supra note 15, at 24–27 (comparing 
implicit learning, which is “learning without effort or awareness of exactly what has been learned” to 
explicit learning, which is “effortful” and “conscious”); Eliot R. Smith & Jamie DeCoster, Dual-
Process Models in Social and Cognitive Psychology: Conceptual Integration and Links to 
Underlying Memory Systems, 4 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 108, 111 (2000); Steven A. 
Sloman, The Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning, 119 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 4 (1996).  But 
see Evans, supra note 15, at 261 (doubting that some versions of the dual-process framework, such 
as the heuristic/systematic processing account, can be reconciled with associationism). 
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potential pattern-pieces, so that a juror who was feeling a strong emotion 
would be unconsciously primed to see and recognize inputs that tended 
to correlate with that emotion in their past experiences.  In other words, 
emotional states bias subsequent information processing in a direction 
that is congruent with past emotional experiences.121 
What this means in practice is that a fearful juror will be more likely 
to notice threatening stimuli,122 to interpret ambiguous stimuli as 
threatening,123 to incorporate a record of these threatening perceptions 
into long-term memory,124 and to remember past instances involving 
threatening stimuli.125  Conversely, a juror who is feeling happy will tend 
to notice positive stimuli, to encode ambiguities in positive ways, and to 
recall and form memories with a positive valence.  Because System 1 
activity is automatic and unconscious, this could occur regardless of 
whether the emotion was aroused by relevant or irrelevant stimuli, so that 
jurors feeling different feelings would end up seeing the evidence itself 
in a different light, even if they did not consciously connect their feelings 
with the evidence in front of them. 
Experimental and observational data confirm exactly this tendency in 
our decision-making.  Our moral and factual judgments are regularly 
shaped by our emotions, even when we are not aware of such effects or 
the reason that we are feeling a particular emotion.  For example, one 
group of investigators induced disgust in experimental subjects by means 
of bad smells, a messy room, and other irrelevant interventions.  When 
the participants were then asked to evaluate whether described conduct 
was moral or immoral, they became more likely to view the conduct as 
immoral compared to others who had not been artificially disgusted.126  
In light of the theory described above, this should not be surprising: We 
are often disgusted by immoral conduct, and so feeling disgusted should 
encourage us—at the associative, System 1 level—to classify ambiguous 
                                                          
 121.  See Niedenthal, supra note 107, at 593–94. 
 122.  See Öhman, supra note 110, at 715–17 (noting that fearful or anxious individuals are more 
likely to focus on threatening information in their environments). 
 123.  See Forgas, supra note 111, at 33–36. 
 124.  See Kensinger & Schacter, supra note 113, at 602–04. 
 125.  See Pettys, supra note 63, at 1632–36 (describing a hypothetical juror who has had 
“experiences in which racially hateful words were closely associated with threatened or actual acts 
of violence”); Hastie, supra note 69, at 1007–08 (asserting that “if a juror is in an angry emotional 
state, he or she is likely to attend to, or retrieve from memory, information that is negative . . . .”). 
 126.  See Simone Schnall et al., Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment, 34 PERSONALITY AND 
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1096, 1097–1104 (2008). 
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stimuli as immoral and to be more watchful for evidence of immoral 
behavior. 
Other researchers have observed similar patterns with other kinds of 
emotions.  To give just a small selection of examples, consider the 
following experimental and observational results: 
 People who are artificially induced to feel excited are more 
likely to evaluate members of the opposite sex as 
attractive.127 
 People whose moods have been elevated by an artificially 
induced smile (by the simple expedient of holding a pen 
cross-wise in their mouths) are more likely to classify a 
described event as pleasant rather than unpleasant, or to find 
a joke funny.128 
 We generally find it pleasing to interact with attractive 
people.  As a result, we are likely to interpret ambiguous 
behavioral cues from those people in a more positive, mood-
congruent manner, which leads us to rate them as more 
honest and more competent than less attractive others.129 
 When participants held a warm cup of coffee in their hands 
while meeting another person, they became more likely to 
judge the other person as warm and caring than would 
otherwise be the case.130 
                                                          
 127.  WILSON, supra note 15, at 100–02.  Wilson describes a classic experiment in which male 
subjects were approached in a park by a young woman with a questionnaire.  Excitement was 
induced by interviewing the subjects on a bridge over a chasm, while controls were interviewed on a 
park bench.  The subjects who were induced to feel excited found the same woman more attractive 
than randomly selected controls, as measured by the frequency with which they asked for her phone 
number.  Id. 
 128.  Paula M. Niedenthal, Embodying Emotion, 316 SCIENCE 1002 (2007) (describing the 
impacts on judgment); James D. Laird, Self-Attribution of Emotion: The Effects of Expressive 
Behavior on the Quality of Emotional Experience, 29 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 475 
(1974) (showing that forming a smile elevates mood, even when the person smiling is unaware that 
they are doing so).  For a broader catalogue of such effects, see Barbara A. Spellman & Simone 
Schnall, Embodied Rationality, 35 QUEEN’S L.J. 117 (2009). 
 129.  Marc-André Reinhard & Siegfried L. Sporer, Content Versus Source Cue Information as a 
Basis for Credibility Judgments: The Impact of Task Involvement, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 93, 95–97 
(2010); Markus M. Mobius & Tanya S. Rosenblat, Why Beauty Matters, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 222, 
233–34 (2006).  There may be other contributing factors leading to this same effect in addition to 
emotional influences; to some extent, beauty itself may prime other positive associations directly 
through networks of conceptual relation.  See Mark Spottswood, Live Hearings and Paper Trials, 38 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827 (2011). 
 130.  Lawrence E. Williams & John A. Bargh, Experiencing Physical Warmth Promotes 
Interpersonal Warmth, 322 SCIENCE 606 (2008). 
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 When study participants learn that a defendant in a 
hypothetical case has engaged in past immoral behavior, the 
dislike they felt towards him made them more likely to see 
his case-related conduct as a cause of harm to other parties, 
even though all evidence of causation was the same.131 
In short, the emotions that judges and jurors feel are likely to induce 
some changes in the ways that they will process evidence at the 
unconscious level, following a general pattern of mood congruence, 
regardless of whether the emotion is induced by case-relevant or 
incidental causes.132  Whether this matters in the sense of influencing 
outcomes is a more difficult question, and one that we cannot answer 
easily by reference to simple, artificial experimental scenarios.  For one 
thing, the effect sizes in many of the experiments I have described are 
relatively small, suggesting that emotions generally operate as a gentle 
nudge on our decisions, rather than a forthright shove in a particular 
direction.133 
Moreover, we should be appropriately cautious before we apply 
these results to legal fact-finding, and in particular, we should assess the 
extent to which special features of that situation may counteract these 
effects.  The trial process, after all, involves a competition between 
opposing advocates, each of whom have incentives to try to activate 
emotions in ways that may induce fact-finders to prefer their story over 
the story of their opponents.  Furthermore, trials take time, from hours to 
months, and over the course of an entire trial it is likely that jurors would 
experience a wide array of emotions.  These aspects of the trial process 
make it different from the typical settings in which psychology 
experiments take place, and it is at least possible that the distinction 
makes a difference. 
This leads to two potentially overlapping possibilities.  First, 
emotions might minimally impact actual verdict decisions by design, if 
advocates are evenly matched in their abilities to prime particular 
emotional responses and to predict which emotions will favor their cases.  
Second, emotions might be irrelevant by chance rather than by design.  If 
emotionally induced biases in decision-making are scattered in an 
approximately random way over the course of a trial, then they should 
tend to cancel each other out on average—although this effect will not 
                                                          
 131.  Nadler & McDonnell, supra note 60, at 291. 
 132.  Niedenthal, supra note 107, at 593–94. 
 133.  See KAHNEMAN, supra note 14, at 55–58. 
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always occur, by virtue of its being merely statistically probable rather 
than necessarily true.134  Thus, although we know, based on substantial 
experimental science and observation, that emotions do influence the 
way we think, the extent to which emotional arousal actually alters real-
life verdict decisions remains a contingent empirical question, which we 
cannot answer by reference to existing psychological data on its own. 
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to believe that, in at least some 
cases, emotions do impact trial outcomes.  Let us first consider the 
possibility that many small effects, averaged over the course of a long 
trial, will tend to cancel each other out probabilistically.  Although this 
might be possible in theory, it may often fail to be realized in practice 
because initial nudges will tend to create cascading effects, leading to 
coherent patterns of emotional activation that tend to be biased towards 
extremes rather than maintaining an even balance.  Such coherence shifts 
are likely to occur because fact-finders do not encounter new pieces of 
information in isolation, but rather in the context of both prior factual 
knowledge and emotional arousal.  As Dan Simon has explained: 
Throughout the decision-making process, the mental representation of 
the considerations undergoes gradual change and ultimately shifts 
toward a state of coherence with either one of the decision alternatives.  
Due to these coherence shifts, at the culmination of the process, the 
decision-maker’s mental model is skewed toward conformity with the 
emerging decision.  As the hard case morphs into an easy one, the 
decision follows easily and confidently.135 
To understand how emotional influences might lead to a coherence 
cascade, imagine a juror who is observing a witness testify.  Early on, 
some aspect of the witness’s appearance, demeanor or testimony might 
inspire either feelings of trust or distrust.  If these initial cues inspire 
warm emotions towards the witness, our juror might be inclined to 
interpret subsequent statements in such a way as to support the witness’s 
credibility; if the juror instead feels hostile to the witness, her attention 
might be drawn instead towards potential contradictions in the testimony.  
This can lead to either an upward or downward cascade in the credibility 
evaluation.  Small levels of initial trust encourage the juror to both attend 
more carefully to subsequent cues indicating trustworthiness, and to 
                                                          
 134.  See Adrian Vermuele, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1500 (2007). 
 135.  Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision 
Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 517 (2004). 
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unconsciously interpret subsequent testimony in a way that explains 
away contradictions and biases, whereas small levels of initial distrust 
supports an opposing cascade.136  Of course, this is not an inexorable 
process.  A witness who initially seemed trustworthy might later be 
caught in a clear lie, while in some cases initial distrust might be 
overcome by sufficient manifestations of trustworthiness.  But it does 
imply that we should be cautious before assuming that small emotional 
influences will simply cancel each other out.  Instead, emotions that are 
aroused early in the process may exert an outsized effect, inducing 
coherence shifts that are not easily undone by subsequent information or 
feelings. 
What about the alternative possibility, that emotions will exert no 
influence because competition by opposing advocates will keep them 
cleanly in balance?  This, too, looks doubtful upon closer examination.  
One problem involves disparities in advocacy quality.  If some lawyers 
are better than others at inspiring emotions that favor their case, then we 
should expect to see emotions having an impact in at least those cases 
involving disparate lawyering quality.  Another problem arises because 
advocacy alone might not be enough to level the playing field; in some 
cases, emotionally arousing evidence is not distributed evenly, or even in 
ways that mimic the underlying merits of the cases.  Prosecutors, for 
instance, frequently have access to a wide array of gruesome crime scene 
details in murder cases, which even innocent defendants may be unable 
to match.137  Finally, as discussed above, emotionally arousing evidence 
introduced early on in a case is likely to have a stronger effect than 
counter-evidence that cannot be introduced until later.  This means that, 
even in cases involving equally matched advocates and evidence that is 
balanced in terms of its emotionally affecting qualities, jurors may still 
be influenced toward one outcome rather than another by the mere fact 
that one party got the first chance to inspire feelings that favored its case.  
                                                          
 136.  See Spottswood, supra note 129, at 844–48 (describing the cognitive mechanisms by which 
a party’s appearance might produce credibility cascades); Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom 
Demeanor: The Theater of the Courtroom, 92 MINN. L. REV. 573, 592–96 (2008) (describing cases 
in which jurors interpreted subtle and ambiguous cues regarding the demeanor of non-testifying 
defendants as either highly sympathetic or untrustworthy); see also S. E. Asch, Forming Impressions 
of Personality, 41 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 258, 270 (1948) (reporting experiments showing 
the powerful effects of early information in shaping our judgments of other people’s character). 
 137.  See DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 172–
73 (2012) (reviewing experiments showing the power of graphic crime scene photographs to alter 
verdict decisions in simulated cases, even when the information revealed by the photographs had 
little relevance). 
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In short, although the extension of experimental data regarding emotional 
influences on cognition to the trial environment does involve empirically 
contingent assumptions, those assumptions are plausible, given the 
nature of coherence shifts as jurors encounter numerous items of 
evidence in sequence. 
So far, I have focused on the ways that emotional influences might 
bias the assimilation of evidence within System 1 processing, but this is 
not the whole story.  We should also expect that emotions will influence 
the way that the juror uses System 2 processes to either focus her 
attention or reason analytically about the case.  Some of these effects will 
be straightforward and in line with the aspirations of the classical view.  
Thus, if a judge has exhorted a jury not to consider a particular fact in its 
deliberations, jurors who start to incorporate that fact into their 
deliberations may start to feel discomfort or anxiety based on their 
failure to obey authoritative instructions.  Likewise, jurors might feel 
anxious about the possibility that they will wrongly decide the case, and 
this anxiety might also motivate them to engage in careful and systematic 
consideration of the evidence.138 
When jurors feel distress in relation to a particular emotion, System 
2 may become involved as they try to redirect their feelings down a 
different path.  Thus, jurors who notice that they are in the grips of a 
powerful emotion may find themselves motivated to try to attain a 
calmer, more detached frame of mind so as not to render a biased 
decision.  To do so, they might employ a number of consciously 
motivated strategies of emotional self-regulation: They might, for 
instance, try to distract themselves by focusing on something more 
calming until they can consider the evidence with a more neutral state of 
mind.139  Alternatively, jurors might try to quiet their feelings by quieting 
the expression of those feelings in their bodies, such as by taking slow, 
deep breaths to slow their heart rate, or by adopting a calm, neutral facial 
expression.  All of these approaches involve the use of System 2 
resources to focus the reasoning process on the content of approved 
evidence and to resist tempting, but potentially dangerous, conclusions. 
                                                          
 138.  See THAGARD, supra note 11, at 166 (explaining the idea of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt in terms of our anticipation of negative emotional consequences arising out of a wrongful 
conviction). 
 139.  See James J. Gross, Emotion Regulation: Conceptual and Empirical Foundations, in 
HANDBOOK OF EMOTION REGULATION 3, 10 (2010) (discussing “attentional deployment” strategies 
of emotional self-regulation). 
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This picture is too rosy, however.  When we consider the ways that 
System 2 will interact with our emotions, we should be wary of 
concluding too readily that reason will always triumph over emotion.  
For one thing, our ability to reason analytically about evidence is 
contingent on our ability to accurately recall the evidence that has been 
presented.  But moods and emotions impact what facts come to our 
minds when we try to remember the past.140  Thus, although a juror may 
assume that thinking about the evidence in a slow and systematic way 
will exclude the effects of emotions on her deliberations, this will not 
always be the case.  If our juror is feeling anxious or fearful while 
deliberating, she may find it easier to recall threatening items of evidence 
than non-threatening ones; if she is feeling disgusted, evidence of norm 
violations or bodily contaminations may come to mind faster than 
evidence that is not so tainted.  And even if a juror is able to maintain a 
very calm emotional state while thinking systematically about the 
evidence, the intricate link between emotion and cognition at the System 
1 level means that her memories about the case will be inextricably 
bound up with the feelings she felt while watching the witnesses testify.  
Through such effects, even an apparently dispassionate chain of analysis 
will end up being shaped by emotional factors, because of the central 
role of emotion in shaping the ways the jurors remember and construe 
the vast spectrum of information they perceived during trial.141  For this 
reason, we should resist the temptation to simplify the idea of dual-
process thinking into the idea that System 1 involves emotions and 
System 2 restrains them.  Instead, emotions shape thinking at both levels. 
What is more, when we consider the role of both systems, we can 
also see why trying too hard to resist one’s feelings can actually be 
                                                          
 140.  See Feigenson, supra note 34, at 61–62 (noting that, generally, “emotional feelings 
influence which facts decision-makers will attend to, how much time they will spend poring over 
them, and how they will interpret and categorize them”); Pettys, supra note 63, at 1633–36; 
Kensinger & Schacter, supra note 113, at 602–04 (discussing emotion’s influence on what an 
individual will remember). 
 141.  This tendency would be exacerbated, to some extent, in jury cases, given that judges often 
refuse to allow juries access to the transcript of trial proceedings during their deliberations, which 
inhibits their ability to check the accuracy of their memories.  See, e.g., United States v. Guy, 924 
F.2d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that a trial court did nor err by refusing to allow a jury to 
review portions of the trial transcripts during deliberations, and that such matters lie “purely within 
the trial court’s discretion”); State v. Lawrence, 530 S.E.2d 807, 824 (N.C. 2000) (trial court did not 
err by denying a jury’s request to review transcripts and by instructing them that “it is your duty to 
recall the evidence as the evidence was presented”); see also Chad Oldfather, Appellate Courts, 
Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 454–55 (2004) 
(discussing the challenges faced by jurors who must rely only on their memories of testimony). 
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counterproductive because such efforts will tend to displace other 
valuable forms of System 2 cognition.  System 2 is both low-capacity, 
meaning that it cannot do many things at once, and ego-depleting, 
meaning that we “run out of steam” if we try to sustain too much analytic 
processing at a stretch.  Once we recall that the emotional self-regulation 
strategies discussed above will require some System 2 resources,142 it 
should become obvious that such self-control processes do not only use 
some of those resources, but they actively compete with other System 2 
processing for cognitive space.143  Experimental evidence confirms this 
prediction: Participants who work hard to suppress their feelings exhibit 
deficits in memory as well as other cognitive skills.144  On reflection, I 
suspect that most readers will have experienced effects like these at some 
point in their own past.  In the wake of an event arousing strong 
emotions, such as a death in the family or the break-up of a relationship, 
we can find it hard to focus on mentally demanding tasks even when we 
are trying hard to maintain a relatively calm emotional tone because the 
mental focus required to suppress emotionally arousing thoughts crowds 
out other activity and eventually wears us down.  In a highly charged 
case, we can imagine similar effects occurring in jurors who are trying as 
hard as they can to be dispassionate; the mere effort involved in 
maintaining a neutral feeling tone may make it harder to think deeply 
about the case, in comparison with a case that did not arouse such strong 
feelings in the first place.145  The end result would be that even jurors 
who successfully suppressed potentially biasing emotional responses 
would have less mental energy to spare for complicated reasoning tasks, 
which could also be a source of outcome errors. 
Finally, one specific emotional pattern may play a particularly 
important, problematic role once judges and juries are engaged in 
deliberative reasoning about a case.  When intuition and analysis start to 
clash, most people will experience some anxiety and discomfort.146  
                                                          
 142.  See Gross, supra note 139, at 8 (noting that the “majority of examples” of emotional 
regulation that he discusses involve effortful and conscious attempts to “down-regulate negative 
emotions”). 
 143.  Emotional Regulation, supra note 65, at 1546 (noting the effects of this competition, 
including distorted memories). 
 144.  Gross, supra note 139, at 11. 
 145.  Bilz, supra note 46, at 463–64. 
 146.  See KAHNEMAN, supra note 14, at 80–81 (noting that we tend to deploy System 2 in a 
biased fashion to confirm our intuitive judgments); WILSON, supra note 15, at 95–97 (surveying 
neuroscientific evidence that the conscious mind will confabulate reasons for judgments even when 
those judgments were actually caused by unrelated factors); Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 91, at 
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Simply put, it is emotionally unpleasant to spend mental effort trying to 
justify a conclusion that feels wrong.  As a result, we often encounter the 
phenomenon of motivated cognition, in which System 2 resources are 
deployed to justify an intuitive conclusion rather than in an attempt to 
independently evaluate its validity.147  Such outcomes are not inevitable; 
by mentally rehearsing the steps of reasoning leading to a contrary 
conclusion, we may sometimes be able to retrain our intuitions so that 
they line up with our higher-order beliefs.148  But because System 2 
reasoning is effortful, we are particularly unlikely to persist in it when 
doing so involves the extra discomforts of maintaining a state of 
cognitive dissonance.  As a result, when judges and jurors start reasoning 
deliberatively about the proper outcome in a case, they may often find 
themselves searching their memories (or the record) for evidence 
supporting a conclusion that they have already made at the intuitive level 
of System 1, rather than going through the facts in a more even-handed 
manner.  Such tendencies, it would seem, are inherent in any human-
driven dispute resolution system, although we might expect them to be 
moderated, to some extent, by adversary presentation (which may feature 
contrary evidence that the fact-finder would otherwise tend to ignore) or 
by reason-giving requirements, such as a judge’s duty to justify certain 
decisions with written opinions (which may force the fact-finder to 
analyze the parties’ arguments in some detail before they can be 
rejected). 
For all these reasons, the dual-process model of fact-finding behavior 
looks like a promising framework for analyzing the complex ways that 
emotions may influence fact-finders.  First, emotional states, whether 
aroused by incidental or relevant stimuli, will shape the associative 
model that is built over the course of a trial by System 1 processes, both 
by guiding attention towards aspects of the evidence that are congruent 
                                                          
243–44 (providing similar evidence based on psychological experiments). 
 147.  See STANOVICH, supra note 82, at 110–11 (discussing the role of willpower in reducing 
such “override failures”).  To be clear, I do not mean to suggest in the discussion above that 
“intuition” is emotionally driven and “analysis” is not.  Instead, as discussed above in the text, both 
processes will be shaped by emotional influences.  But to the extent that intuitive and deliberative 
thinking might tend to point in different directions, such as in a case involving a defendant who 
“seems guilty” despite having strong analytical evidence of innocence, the concept of motivated 
cognition provides one mechanism by which intuitions can win the contest.  See generally Hidden 
Structure, supra note 19, at 171–93. 
 148.  Cf. Leslie S. Greenberg, The Clinical Application of Emotion in Psychotherapy, in 
HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS, supra note 101, at 88, 88–89, 92–95 (discussing emotion-focused therapy, 
which uses a combination of emotional management strategies and cognitive reflection to redirect 
and reframe persistent negative feelings). 
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with the dominant mood-state, and by changing the ways that ambiguous 
details will be construed.  Second, emotional effects will be magnified in 
situations where jurors are encountering a witness or a factual scenario 
for the first time, given the phenomenon of coherence shifts, but will be 
milder if they arise only once a juror has already developed a well-
structured associative model of that person or event.  Third, emotional 
states will also shape the ways that System 2 draws on this associative 
model as judges and jurors shift into more deliberative modes of 
processing the evidence.  Affective states will influence what facts about 
the case come most easily to mind, what elements are used to fill gaps in 
the parties narratives, as well as the extent to which System 2 processing 
is used to either re-examine intuitively attractive conclusions or instead 
to justify and defend them.  Finally, because the use of System 2 is 
effortful and mentally draining, attempts to suppress or control emotions 
may be unsuccessful, and even when such efforts succeed, they will tend 
to diminish a juror’s capacity to engage in careful and deliberative 
reasoning regarding the evidence. 
IV. TOWARDS A MORE BALANCED APPROACH TO REGULATING 
EMOTIONS AT TRIAL 
Thus far, the discussion has been merely descriptive.  I have tried, 
for the sake of simplicity, to focus on how emotions will influence 
reasoning, without getting drawn into discussions of whether such 
influences will improve or worsen the quality of verdicts.  Now, with a 
reasonably good model of how emotions shape judgments, we can turn to 
these more difficult questions. 
In this section, I offer an analytical framework for determining when 
emotional influences are likely to be helpful, when they will be harmful, 
and when their impacts will be mixed.  Using this framework, I survey a 
number of ways that judges could use their existing powers under the 
rules of evidence to strike a better balance between positive and negative 
emotional effects.  Following that, I propose reforms that might give 
judges both the encouragement and the knowledge that they need to 
engage in a more sophisticated kind of emotional management during 
trials.  To this end, I suggest three significant changes to current practice: 
First, we should enact a revised version of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 
(and similar state rules) that creates a duty to intervene in more cases, but 
offers judges more options than simply excluding evidence when 
intervention is necessary.  Second, we should make a short course of 
training in emotional cognition a standard part of the educational process 
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that new trial judges undergo when they first begin their duties.  Third, 
we should provide a more meaningful process for litigants who wish to 
object to emotionally prejudicial evidence within the context of bench 
trials. 
A. A Typology of Trial Emotions 
In place of global trust or distrust in emotional influences within the 
trial process, which are equally foolish, a more sophisticated approach 
would give free rein to those emotional influences that help fact-finders 
make good decisions, while channeling or preventing those emotions that 
are harmful.  If that level of nuance is to become courtroom reality, the 
first step must be to provide courts with guidance so that they can tell the 
difference between good and bad emotional influences.  To this end, I 
develop a typology of trial emotions.  In constructing this framework, I 
start with Hastie’s distinction between incidental emotions, which are 
caused by factors entirely unrelated to the trial and are therefore rarely an 
aid to the process, and decision-relevant emotions, which arise as a 
response to the trial itself, and therefore have more mixed effects.  I 
divide decision-relevant emotions into several sub-categories so that we 
can demarcate when they are likely to help the fact-finding process and 
when they are likely to hamper it.  The first category consists of “task-
congruent emotions,” which are those feelings that are naturally 
associated with learning about another person’s illegal conduct.  These 
kinds of feelings generally promote accurate fact-finding, and 
suppressing them would be either futile or counterproductive.  The 
second category consists of decision-relevant emotions that are 
nonetheless “task-incongruent.”  These are emotions that are produced 
by the evidence, but that arise from features of the case other than proof 
of the conduct that forms the basis of alleged guilt or liability.  Such 
emotions are almost always unhelpful.  Finally, we must consider 
“hybrid emotions,” which are task-congruent for some purposes but 
which are also likely to have task-incongruent impacts.  Such emotions 
require special measures if we wish to ensure that trials are as accurate as 
possible. 
Let us start with Hastie’s concept of “incidental emotions.”  As he 
defined the category, it includes the “ambient mood or emotional 
state . . . at the time of the decision,” which arises based on factors other 
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than the evidence in the case or the stress of making a decision.149  He 
offers the examples of jurors who are “angry . . . because she has heard 
her favorite baseball team lost an important game, or . . . happy . . . 
because he had a positive interaction with his children over breakfast.”150  
As Hastie sees it, the influence of incidental emotions is generally 
“maladaptive” because such emotions are essentially random and 
unrelated to the facts of a particular case.151 
Nevertheless, we have good reason to think that incidental emotions 
can alter verdict decisions.  Multiple laboratory studies demonstrate that 
altering baseline mood states can affect factual construal.  For instance, 
Jennifer Lerner, Julie Goldberg, and Philip Tetlock performed an 
experiment in which research participants were asked to make liability 
judgments regarding a personal injury suit.152  Some of the participants 
were first put into an angry mood state by watching a short film in which 
two bullies violently attack a young boy.153  The anger that this induced 
in participants, although irrelevant to the hypothetical civil case, 
increased their willingness to find the defendant liable and increased 
their recommended damages award.154  Nor are such findings a mere 
artifact of laboratory experiments.  Judges, when they speak candidly, 
sometimes acknowledge that they have been subject to similar effects.155  
And researchers have observed dramatic swings in real-world sentencing 
decisions based on the length of time that judges have been sitting on the 
                                                          
 149.  Hastie, supra note 69, at 1000. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. at 1002. 
 152.  Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Sober Second Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger, and 
Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility, 24 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 563, 564 
(1998). 
 153.  Id. at 566. 
 154.  Id. at 570; see also Julie H. Goldberg et al., Rage and Reason: The Psychology of the 
Intuitive Prosecutor, 29 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 781, 789–90 (1999) (replicating and extending these 
results). 
 155.  An excellent example is found in Judge Alex Kozinski’s essay, Teetering on the High 
Wire, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1217, 1219 (1997).  In that essay, Judge Kozinski describes a case he 
presided over as trial judge, in which a young woman plead guilty to cocaine trafficking.  The judge 
had recently gone through a very frightening event in which his toddler-age son had left the house 
and wandered into traffic.  The judge found that the recent, intense experience of being “spared 
[from] the tragic consequence of [his] error” made it seem as if he should “err[] on the side of 
forgiveness” when it came to sentencing the defendant, and so he gave a very light sentence of six 
months in jail, community service, and five-years probation.  Id.  As the judge acknowledges, such 
influences can seem troubling, given that he might have been feeling a radically different set of 
impulses if “one of [his] sons had been addicted to drugs, or God forbid, died as a result of a drug 
overdose[.]”  Id. at 1220. 
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bench without a break, suggesting that even relatively prosaic mood 
states like boredom and hunger can influence outcomes at trial.156 
Obviously judges and jurors are human beings, not robots, and 
cannot suppress all their incidental emotions during a trial.  Further, it is 
quite hard to say, from a theoretical perspective, what sort of baseline 
emotional state is best for fact-finding.  But leaving those deeper 
complexities to the side for now, it is easy enough to concur with Hastie 
to this extent: When incidental emotions are powerful enough, and when 
the specific emotions in question may be associated with a particularly 
problematic decisional tendency, they are certainly an unwelcome 
addition to the trial environment.  Thus, we can imagine many 
circumstances when such influences would best be excluded to the extent 
possible.  A newly grieving juror might be excused from duty, for 
instance, while a mindful judge who just had an episode of “road rage” 
while driving in heavy traffic might do well to postpone the afternoon’s 
hearings until he could drink a calming cup of tea. 
What, then, of Hastie’s contrasting category of “decision-relevant 
emotions?”  Hastie’s exploration of this theme was brief, focusing 
primarily on the stress of deciding a case and the anticipatory feelings 
that might arise as jurors contemplate the possible consequences of 
different verdicts.157  But there are many other emotional states that 
might arise, not for incidental reasons, but as a consequence of the trial 
process itself, which I shall now consider in turn. 
Let us first consider a category that I call “task-congruent emotions.”  
Such emotions are those that arise from evidence showing that a party 
has either done the harm, or suffered wrongs, that are at issue in the trial, 
and which tend to influence the fact-finder to either punish, or 
compensate, the party in accordance with the law’s demands.  As an 
example, consider some of the feelings reported by a juror in the trial of 
Rodney King’s civil suit against the City of Los Angeles over his widely 
publicized beating at the hands of Los Angeles Police Department 
officers.  During the trial, the jurors watched the video of the savage 
                                                          
 156.  See generally Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6889 (2011).  The observed variance was quite large.  The study focused on 
Israeli judges who were sitting on panels to hear prisoners’ requests for parole or sentence 
modifications.  When the judges were freshly back from a break, they granted such requests most of 
the time; towards the end of a lengthy session, the grant rate dropped to nearly zero.  See id. at 6889–
90. 
 157.  See Hastie, supra note 69, at 1002–06 (exploring how anticipated emotions play a central 
role in decision making). 
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assault, in which officers hit King repeatedly with batons, kicked him, 
and shocked him with a stun gun.  As a result, one juror reported feeling 
intense emotions in relation to the case: She “broke down in tears on 
several occasions,” she felt “sick to her stomach,” and she said she was 
“haunted” by King’s screams on the tape.158  Another juror reported that 
he found it difficult to sleep during the trial.159  Clearly, these jurors (who 
ultimately voted for a $3.8 million award against the City)160 were 
feeling a potent mix of compassion for King, anger at the officers, and 
sorrow regarding the overall incident.  But we should hesitate before 
concluding that there was anything corrupting or maladaptive about such 
feelings.  When one encounters evidence of norm violations by others, 
particularly dramatic and violent ones, anger, grief, and sympathy are 
natural responses.  Furthermore, as discussed above, these emotions are 
typically adaptive: They help us notice and remember particular items of 
evidence that reveal law violations, and they motivate us to aid the 
person who is suffering and to take action against the wrongdoers.  Thus, 
we have every reason to think that the task-congruent emotions felt by 
the King jurors encouraged them to do exactly what the law required 
them to do, which was to compensate King while punishing the parties 
who were responsible for his harm.161 
More generally, we should be cautious before concluding that there 
is anything normatively problematic about task-congruent emotions at 
trial.  A trial is, by its essence, often an intense experience.  When 
wrongdoing has occurred, jurors are likely to get angry or upset about it, 
and such feelings are likely to help them do their jobs.  If we told them to 
suppress their feelings, they would probably be unable to do so, and 
would most likely just go on feeling what they were feeling while 
remaining silent about it.  But suppose, for a moment that they could 
suppress strong emotions when learning of strong evidence of norm 
violations; what would be the result?  Quite plausibly, in the absence of 
bad feelings about a defendant’s conduct, jurors would be less motivated 
                                                          
 158.  John L. Mitchell & Tina Daunt, King Jury’s Voice of Reason Carried a Private Burden: 
Trial: Forewoman Juggled Her Courtroom Duties With Beliefs Formed During Marriage to an Ex-
Black Panther, L.A. TIMES (June 3, 1994), http://articles.latimes.com/1994-06-03/news/mn-
65530_1_jury-room. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Seth Mydans, Rodney King Is Awarded $3.8 Million, N.Y. TIMES (April 20, 1994), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/20/us/rodney-king-is-awarded-3.8-million.html. 
 161.  See Angry Judges, supra note 53, at 1262 (noting that the emotion of anger can “narrow[] 
and focus[] attention and “motivate[] responsive action”). 
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to sanction him, regardless of the formal dictates of the law.162  Indeed, 
as studies of patients with impaired abilities to experience emotion have 
shown, people who cannot experience emotional states do not become 
hyper-rational Vulcans, but rather become supremely indecisive.163  At 
trial, this would be likely to result, not in unusually accurate verdicts, but 
instead in an unusually large number of mistrials, as affectless jurors 
would find themselves too indecisive to reach verdicts. 
Of course, this is not to say that task-congruent emotion could never 
lead jurors astray.  If jurors learn a biased, misleading or incomplete 
version of the facts, which give a false sense of a party’s guilt or 
innocence, then that emotion will be prompting them to do something 
problematic.  But notice that the problem here is not the emotion itself, 
but rather the skewed evidentiary portrait that prevented the feelings 
from becoming aligned with the underlying facts of the case.  This 
insight lets us sharpen our definition of task-congruent emotion 
somewhat, and stipulate that an emotion is task-congruent only when the 
strength of the emotion corresponds with the strength of the evidence 
that inspires it.  Thus, evidence that strongly shows guilt may be 
congruent with similarly strong feelings of anger, whereas weak 
evidence of guilt would no longer be congruent with a similarly vengeful 
emotion.  Indeed, this last point may go some way towards explaining 
our pervasive distrust of character-propensity proof.164  Learning, for 
example, that a defendant charged with forgery was previously convicted 
of child molestation would tend to only weakly show his guilt.  Even if 
the prior crime evidences some general tendency towards lawless 
behavior, the two offenses are so far apart that the inference cannot be a 
strong one.  But the prior crime evidence would tend to greatly disturb 
and anger most jurors, given the extremely disturbing acts involved.  
Thus, even though the evidence does show guilt to some extent, and the 
emotion encourages a finding of guilt, the correspondence between the 
strength of the emotion and the strength of the evidence is so low that we 
would not wish to encourage it.  As such, we should not include it within 
the category of accuracy-furthering, task-congruent emotions. 
                                                          
 162.  See Posner, supra note 12, at 310 (noting that “[t]here is no action without emotion”). 
 163.  See DAMASIO, supra note 21, at 170–73 (noting that those who try to make decisions based 
purely on reason, will “take an inordinately long time” or perhaps will not even reach a decision, 
instead getting “lost in the byways of [] calculation”). 
 164.  See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404–05, 608–09. 
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That helps us elucidate the next category in our typology, which we 
can call “task-incongruent emotion.”  An emotion felt during trial would 
be task-incongruent when two things are true: First, the emotion tends to 
influence decision-making in the case, and second, the intensity of the 
emotion fails to track changes in the probability that a party engaged in 
disputed wrongdoing or suffered disputed harms.  The character proof 
discussed above is task-incongruent, because the strength of the feeling 
is vastly greater than the probative force of the underlying evidence. 
To this initial example, we might add many more types of trial 
emotions that are usually thought to be problematic.  For instance, it has 
been observed that parties who have an attractive appearance usually fair 
better in court cases than those who are unattractive.165  Unless the 
defendant is charged with impersonating a supermodel, however, it is 
doubtful that their appearance has much relation to their guilt.  As a 
result, the good feelings a juror feels towards a party on account of their 
beauty would be task-incongruent.  Likewise, if a juror was favorably 
disposed towards a party because that party reminded them of a well-
liked friend or family member, those feelings would also be task-
incongruent.  Or similarly, if a jury takes a liking to a particularly 
charming attorney who is representing a party, and as a result finds it 
easier to vote in that party’s favor, we will be worried, because there is 
little reason to think that attorney charm correlates with a client’s guilt or 
innocence.  Once we have this dichotomy in place, we can see that, to the 
extent the classical view of emotions at trial seems attractive, it is 
because many of the emotions that come to mind when we think of jurors 
being moved towards a verdict by their feelings are, in fact, task-
incongruent. 
In fact, a bit of reflection shows that the earlier category of 
“incidental emotions,” which was first explored by Hastie,166 could 
actually be analyzed as one subtype of task-incongruency.  Emotions are 
incidental to the trial process when they arise for reasons wholly 
unrelated to the evidence, such as if a judge were to decide a case while 
grieving for the death of a close relative.  To the extent that such feelings 
do not influence judgments of guilt or liability, they need not concern us.  
                                                          
 165.  Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (2009) 
(collecting studies).  Cf. Marc W. Patry, Attractive but Guilty: Deliberation and the Physical 
Attractiveness Bias, 102 PSYCHOL. REP. 727, 728 (2008) (noting the general effect, but adding the 
caveat that defendants who “used their attractiveness in the execution of a crime” may be punished 
more harshly than otherwise-similar, less-attractive defendants). 
 166.  Hastie, supra note 69, at 1000–02. 
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But to the extent that they do, they fit the model of task-incongruency 
perfectly, because the strength of such emotions would not track the 
underlying likelihoods that parties either engaged in charged conduct or 
were harmed by it.  As a result, I suggest that the congruency and 
incongruency divide is a more useful analytic tool than the distinction 
between incidental and decision-relevant feelings. 
Last but not least, we must account for the possibility that some 
kinds of trial emotions will overlap between the two categories described 
above.  Such “hybrid” emotions will present courts with unique 
challenges if they are to be managed with an eye toward accurate fact-
finding.  The first, and most obvious, example of a hybrid trial emotion 
arises when a party testifies, so that emotional responses have the 
potential to simultaneously impact credibility and guilt or liability 
judgments.  Because of such emotional spillover, criminal defendants 
must often wrestle with the choice of whether or not to waive their right 
to testify, knowing that if they do take the stand, they take the risk that 
evidence used to impeach them may also cause a jury to dislike them 
more generally.167 
For another example of a hybrid trial emotion, consider the common 
scenario in which a tort plaintiff, who is suing a wealthy corporate 
defendant, puts on evidence of his extreme pain and suffering as part of 
his case for damages.  The compassion and sorrow that a judge or juror 
might feel while learning such facts is quite appropriate in the context of 
calculating the extent of the plaintiff’s harm, because the greater the 
injuries, the more intense the emotion is likely to be, leading fact-finders 
who feel greater sympathy to become more generous.168  But these same 
sympathetic feelings are task-incongruent when we consider other 
questions at issue in the case, such as whether the defendant took 
reasonable steps ex ante to prevent the injury.169  As I shall discuss in 
more detail below, the intense emotions that are appropriate to the task of 
assessing damages may also encourage jurors to see liability where none 
exists, either out of a deliberate desire to aid the victim or as a result of 
subtler, unconscious processes that attempt to knit scattered trial 
                                                          
 167.  See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(B) (authorizing the admission of some prior convictions for 
the purpose of impeaching criminal defendants); Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the 
Federal Courts Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants With Prior Convictions, 42 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 294–96 (2008) (noting the difficult decision defendants must face). 
 168.  See Feigenson, supra note 34, at 16 (noting that it is appropriate in some cases for jurors to 
consider sympathy when determining damages). 
 169.  Id. at 57–64. 
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impressions into a coherent whole.  Once again, we see the problem that 
an emotion can be simultaneously useful for one trial purpose and 
counterproductive with respect to another. 
Finally, to see a different way that emotions could have hybridized 
influences, consider the complex functioning of emotions in the process 
of determining a witness’s credibility.  It is the rare trial in which all 
witnesses are equally trustworthy; rather, credibility evaluation is a 
central part of a fact-finder’s task.  In connection with this, feelings of 
trust or distrust towards particular witnesses are an important contributor 
towards credibility determinations.  Jurors, after all, must collate many 
different kinds of facts in arriving at a credibility decision, ranging from 
the witness’s demeanor on the stand, to inconsistencies in her story, to 
her more general character as an honest or dishonest person.170  Nor is 
there any straightforward protocol by which conflicts between these 
different kinds of evidence are ordinarily resolved; rather, jurors will 
have to decide whether a prior inconsistent statement weighs more 
heavily than her transparent and innocent demeanor on the stand, or 
whether a witness’s financial bias towards one party in the case is more 
important than either of the foregoing.  It is precisely when jurors must 
balance a large number of factors, without any overall guiding principle, 
that we should expect that intuition and feelings will play a strong role in 
producing the overall judgment, by shaping what the jurors notice, 
commit to memory, and recall most easily when they start to deliberate.  
As a result, credibility related emotions deserve special attention in any 
broader theory of emotional fact-finding. 
Unfortunately, it is hard to lump in credibility related emotions as 
either usually helpful, like task-congruent emotion, or usually unhelpful, 
like incongruent emotion.  On the one hand, it is clear that in some cases, 
feelings of distrust will be clearly tied to real variations in a witness’s 
honesty.  For example, if a witness is shown to have taken a bribe in 
exchange for her testimony, or if she is repeatedly caught in lies under 
oath, jurors will probably feel angry and distrustful towards that witness, 
and such feelings will likely further their overall weighing of the 
evidence in the case.  To the extent that distrust arises from evidence that 
actually indicates dishonesty, it would be task-congruent.  But by 
contrast, if jurors develop a distrust of a witness purely based on subtle 
                                                          
 170.  See FED. R. EVID. 404(a), 608, 609 (carving out broad exceptions to the general bar on 
character propensity evidence so that a witness’s character for truthfulness can be the subject of 
proof at trial). 
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defects in her demeanor credibility, experimental evidence suggests that 
such feelings are likely to bear little relation to the witness’s actual 
honesty or dishonesty, making the feeling largely incongruent to the task 
at hand.171  Similarly, there are reasons to doubt that prior acts of 
dishonesty are very predictive of a witness’s willingness to lie on the 
stand in a particular case, even if they produce strong feelings in 
jurors.172  Unfortunately, the trust or distrust that a juror feels towards a 
particular witness will often arise from a blend of these sources, making 
it partially congruent and partially incongruent. 
Perhaps most troubling, there is a strong potential for coherence 
shifts based on initial feelings of trust or distrust with respect to a 
particular witness.  Given that many of the cues involved in deciding 
whether to trust someone are fairly ambiguous in nature, we can easily 
imagine that small initial prompts towards favorable or unfavorable 
feelings can lead witnesses to subsequently magnify the importance of 
congruent cues and dismiss contrary evidence.173  Accordingly, the 
normative value of credibility related emotions in the trial process is hard 
to determine.  Some amount of reliance on them seems inescapable, and 
when credibility calls are easy they probably contribute to accurate fact-
finding, but when the cues are more ambiguous or when multiple cues 
point in different directions, the feelings may lack a strong connection to 
the underlying honesty of the witness. 
Thus, in this section we have developed what will serve as a useful 
analytic framework when we are trying to assess the appropriate judicial 
response to the varying emotions that arise at trial.  When judges 
encounter strong incidental emotions, which arise from circumstances 
external to the trial process, they should recognize the risk that such 
influences will corrupt the fact-finding process.  When they consider 
task-congruent emotions, the strength of which vary in response to the 
                                                          
 171.  See Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgments, 10 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 214, 229–30 (2006) (collecting and analyzing over 200 
deception studies to conclude that both experts and non-experts have an accuracy rate below fifty-
five percent in demeanor-based credibility evaluations, with no significant gain being realized by 
expertise); Siegfried L. Sporer & Barbara Schwandt, Moderators of Nonverbal Indicators of 
Deception: A Meta-Analytic Synthesis, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1, 26 (2007) (reviewing the 
literature and concluding that lay people are systematically mistaken when asked what demeanor 
cues reliably indicate deception). 
 172.  See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Reshaping the “Grotesque” Doctrine of Character Evidence: 
The Reform Implications of the Most Recent Psychological Research, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 741, 763–
764 (2008) (noting that such an “inference is unjustifiable when the prior conduct is unrelated to 
truthfulness”). 
 173.  See Simon, supra note 135, at 517. 
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likelihood that a party is guilty or liable and which tend to promote a 
decision in accordance with the law, they should consider such emotions 
to be a fair and proper part of the trial process, rather than a problem to 
be solved.  Conversely, when features of the trial are likely to give rise to 
task-incongruent emotions, which may influence a decision but whose 
strength bears little relation to probabilities of guilt or innocence, judges 
should use the tools at their disposal to either prevent the emotions from 
arising or to mitigate the harm they may cause.  Finally, when it comes to 
hybrid emotions, judges must strike a balance between furthering the 
aspects of the emotional experience that are task-congruent without also 
allowing those emotions to contaminate other judgments to which they 
do not properly relate.  Hopefully, with a better understanding of these 
matters in hand, judges will be better able to decide when trial emotions 
are something to be encouraged, when they should be prevented or 
suppressed, and when a more nuanced strategy is required. 
B. Using Existing Rules to Better Regulate Emotions at Trial 
Now that we have made some traction in identifying when trial 
emotions are likely to help the process and when they are likely to hinder 
it, we can consider what judges might do under existing rules and 
practices to help realize a better balance of good and bad emotions in the 
courtroom.  For the sake of simplicity, I will focus on the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, given that most states largely conform their own rules to 
that model.174  I will consider two rules in particular: The first, which I 
have already discussed, is Rule 403, which authorizes judges to exclude 
evidence whenever “its probative value is substantially outweighed by a 
danger of . . . unfair prejudice.”175  The drafters indicated that the idea of 
unfair prejudice was largely synonymous with an emotional (rather than 
a reasoned) decision,176 and trial judges regularly use this rule when they 
worry that the emotional impact of evidence will corrode the fairness of 
the jury’s decision.177  The second, Rule 611, directs courts to exercise 
control over the “mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting 
                                                          
 174.  Reed, supra note 31, at 212. 
 175.  FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 176.  See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note. 
 177.  See, e.g., United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1252 (4th Cir. 1993) (outlining rule 403 
and its availability to trial courts).  See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 10, at § 4.13 
(collecting authority for the proposition that the “greatest danger” against which 403 protects is the 
“injection of powerful emotional elements” into a trial). 
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evidence” in order to “make those procedures effective for determining 
the truth.”178  This rule, unlike Rule 403, gives judges more ways to 
manage the emotional environment of a trial than mere exclusion of 
evidence, but it omits any specific reference to the concept of “unfair 
prejudice,” with the result that judges are less likely to look to this rule 
when confronting emotionally intense evidence.  This is unfortunate, 
because closer attention to regulating the mode and order of proof may 
allow judges to prevent or mitigate a substantial amount of problematic 
emotional influences, without the high costs that attend the total 
exclusion of evidence. 
Exclusion is strong medicine, and as a result there is a widespread 
consensus that Rule 403 should be used only sparingly, giving effect to a 
liberal policy in favor of admitting as much relevant evidence as 
possible.179  On one level, this may seem like a sensible policy, given that 
the effects of many emotions at trial may be uncertain, and indeed, in the 
case of hybrid emotions, may seem to blend both good and bad effects.  
From this perspective, excluding relevant evidence on the ground that it 
may arouse the jury’s passion is trading away a certain benefit (its 
informational value) to prevent an uncertain harm (emotionally mediated 
prejudice).  Judges more often prefer to rely on limiting instructions,180 
which provide at least some possibility of preventing the potential harms, 
and which do not require the exclusion of any evidence. 
There are multiple problems with this approach, however.  First, 
although limiting instructions can have some beneficial effects if they are 
used sparingly and if their rationale is clearly communicated to the 
jury,181 the more they accumulate the harder it will be for the jury to keep 
them all in mind.  Second, even if jurors try to put their emotions to one 
side, their feelings are likely to influence who they believe, what facts 
they recall, and what stories they find to be reasonable.  Their emotions, 
therefore, can still shape their judgment even when they are trying their 
hardest to reason analytically.  Third, the dual-process model shows us 
                                                          
 178.  FED. R. EVID. 611(a). 
 179.  See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 10, at § 4:12 (collecting cases). 
 180.  See FED. R. EVID. 105 (outlining the availability of limiting instructions for use by judges); 
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Impoverishing the Trier of Fact: Excluding the Proponent’s Expert 
Testimony Due to the Opponent’s Inability to Afford Rebuttal Evidence, 40 CONN. L. REV. 317, 336 
(2007) (explaining that admission with a limiting instruction that eliminates prejudice is preferred 
over exclusion). 
 181.  See David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 407, 423–39 (2013) (reviewing studies of evidentiary instruction). 
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that suppressing emotions increases the cognitive load in System 2, 
which creates a real risk that the jurors will be less willing or less able to 
carefully evaluate the evidence, making them more likely to make 
judgments driven primarily by the automatic, intuitive System 1.  But the 
biggest problem with this approach is that it represents a missed 
opportunity, because there are more ways to mitigate or prevent 
emotional prejudice than the two most common remedies of exclusion 
and limiting instructions.  To the extent that judges, in applying Rule 403 
as their primary means of emotional control, assume otherwise, they 
leave many of their best tools locked away. 
What if, instead, judges thought to exercise their broader set of 
prerogatives under Rule 611, as well as a few other rules, when trying to 
limit the force of emotional evidence?  If they were to do so, and if they 
had internalized the understanding of emotional cognition that I have 
advanced in this article, they would realize that there are a number of 
ways that they can admit evidence while blunting some of its 
problematic emotional effects. 
First, judges could prevent emotions from setting off problematic 
coherence shifts by exercising discretionary control over the order and 
timing of proof.  As I explained above, one of the ways that a dual-
process account of emotional fact-finding differs from ordinary judicial 
common sense is that it emphasizes the unconscious cognitive processing 
that jurors are putting in while sitting silently and listening to the 
evidence in a case.  Even if they do not perceive themselves to be 
thinking or deciding anything, they are building an implicit model that 
links the people and events in the case into a semi-coherent whole, as 
well as deciding which witnesses they can trust.  Because this process is 
iterative over time and biased in favor of coherence, relatively small 
initial prompts can have larger subsequent effects, at least when the 
evidence is close enough to be ambiguous.182  But this is most likely to 
occur if the fact-finder has not yet developed a strong associative model 
of the facts that are connected with that particular emotion.  For instance, 
if jurors learn an unsavory fact about a witness shortly after he takes the 
stand, the distaste they feel as a result may prompt them, at an 
unconscious level, to search for reasons why that witness should not be 
                                                          
 182.  See Simon, supra note 135, at 519. (“[C]oherence shifts polarize perceptions of the 
evidence.  Jurors with a slight initial inclination to acquit or convict are likely to amplify their 
perception of the case, so that evidence that is weakly probative of guilt can be transformed to create 
mental models that strongly support either innocence or guilt.”). 
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believed.  If, however, they hear the same information at a later point 
within the witness’s testimony, then the feelings are less likely to sway 
their overall trust in the witness. 
Thus, one way that judges can mitigate emotional prejudice, short of 
exclusion, is to manage the taking of testimony so that damaging 
information is elicited only after other relevant facts.  Note, however, 
that this is not a strategy that should be applied in all cases where 
evidence may give rise to strong emotions.  It would make no sense, for 
instance, to delay evidence that the defendant committed a murder in 
order to shield that defendant from emotional “prejudice,” because such 
feelings would be congruent to the task of assessing the accused’s guilt 
of the crime.  Rather, it is only when evidence, despite its relevance, is 
likely to give rise to task-incongruent emotions, that it should be delayed 
in order to mitigate those impacts. 
Of course, deciding how to do this will sometimes be easy, but not 
always.  When the incongruent feelings in question are most likely to 
affect levels of trust in particular witnesses, then the natural structure of 
examinations already achieves this end to a significant extent, in that 
most impeaching evidence will be brought out during cross-examination 
rather than on direct.  When the emotions in question are likely to have 
complicated spillover effects on central questions in the case, however, 
the management challenge becomes greater. 
Consider, for instance, the scenario that arises in many tort trials 
where both questions of causation and the extent of damages are going to 
be vigorously litigated.  Hearing detailed accounts of a plaintiff’s 
suffering early in a case may induce sympathy, sorrow, and anger in the 
jury, leading them to search, whether consciously or unconsciously, for a 
wrongdoer to punish.183  At the same time, the extent of damages is often 
orthogonal to questions of the defendant’s responsibility, such as in cases 
where a toxic exposure certainly caused harm to the plaintiff,184 but in 
which many possible defendants might be the unique cause of that 
exposure.  Although plaintiffs are generally given latitude to order their 
case in any way they see fit, this creates a real risk that, by starting with 
evidence that is primarily relevant to damages before proceeding to 
                                                          
 183.  See MELVIN J. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A FUNDAMENTAL DELUSION 74–
78, 120–122 (1980) (explaining that sympathy comes from a sense of identity with the victim and 
that sympathy for a victim can even cause a person to wrongly find themselves to blame). 
 184.  See Edith Green & Brian Bornstein, Precious Little Guidance: Jury Instruction on Damage 
Awards, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 743, 756 (2000). 
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address complicated issues regarding the defendant’s responsibility, the 
plaintiff might be inducing the jury to favor interpretations of the 
causation evidence that make the defendant responsible for the harm.  
Here, a judge might do well to use their powers under Rule 611 to 
demand that the plaintiff order her proof so as to argue causation 
questions before damages.  And sometimes, such as in cases where the 
causation question is doubtful and the emotions are likely to be 
particularly intense, judges might be well advised to take things a step 
further, and use their discretionary authority to bifurcate the trial into 
separate liability and damages phases.185 
Second, judges could prevent emotions from becoming attached to 
inappropriate referents by exercising discretionary control over who is 
present in the courtroom when those emotions are aroused—although 
sometimes, this will require the cooperation of the parties.  Earlier, I 
discussed the tendency of System 1 to allow emotions that arise for one 
reason to influence other, unrelated judgments.  A negative mood elicited 
by a bad smell, for instance, can make people judge other people’s 
behavior more harshly.186  If we add in System 1’s tendency to 
incorporate observed patterns of experience into new unconscious 
expectations, we face a troubling prospect: If the jurors experience strong 
emotions in the presence of a party, they may come, over time, to 
associate those feelings with that party, even if the feelings arose for 
largely unrelated reasons.  The situation is analogous to a person who, 
after enjoying a particular food for years, becomes violently ill after 
eating it at a favorite restaurant.  Even if he knows, intellectually, that the 
food did not cause the illness, because his dining companions shared the 
dish and did not become ill, he may develop a strong association between 
that taste and the subsequent nausea, which spoils his enjoyment of the 
dish in the future. 
Imagine, then, a similar kind of process that might occur at trial.  A 
person accused of murder might rest his defense theory on an alibi, 
trying to convince the jury that someone else, rather than him, committed 
the crime.  The prosecutor, however, would not limit herself to rebutting 
the alibi evidence, even if the defendant was willing to concede that the 
victim was murdered.  Rather, the prosecutor would typically offer 
evidence describing the details of the murder, so that the jury could find 
in their favor regarding all the elements of the crime and develop a full 
                                                          
 185.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). 
 186.  Schnall, supra note 126, at 1097–1104. 
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picture of the events at issue in the case.187  If these facts are particularly 
gruesome, then the jury may find themselves frequently feeling disgusted 
and outraged in the defendant’s presence.  When it comes time to 
evaluate his credibility or other evidence suggesting that he was not the 
culprit, then it is possible that they will find themselves unconsciously 
primed to see him as a murderer because they have previously often felt 
these strong, negative emotions in his presence.188 
Note, however, that it is not simply the fact that the jury is angry that 
a murder took place that creates the prejudicial, task-incongruent effect 
of these emotions.  Ordinarily, after all, when we discover that there has 
been a murder, our first impulse is to punish whoever actually did it, 
rather than another person who is innocent.  As a result, there is no 
reason to expect that any arousal of the jury’s disgust or anger in relation 
to the murder would necessarily be vented on the defendant.  Rather, a 
key contributor to this tendency would be that the jury experienced these 
feelings while the defendant was in the room and while he provided a 
natural target for their attention.  To return to the dining analogy, one 
does not ordinarily develop food-related revulsions every time one 
becomes ill; instead, this would usually occur only when there was a 
close connection, in time and space, between eating a particular food and 
getting sick. 
Happily, judges—through a combination of discretionary orders, 
juror admonishment, and suggestions to the parties—may be able to 
mitigate such effects.  First, one potential means toward mitigating this 
kind of associative emotional cross-contamination would be to encourage 
the parties to absent themselves from the courtroom while emotionally 
intense evidence is being offered.  After all, if the parties are not present, 
the potential associations are likely to be weaker.  Of course, some 
parties have a right to be present during court proceedings,189 so this 
procedure will often require their consent.  Likewise, there may be some 
risk that the jurors would draw negative inferences from the absence of 
the parties.  However, if the court were to explain to the jurors that the 
                                                          
 187.  Cf. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (where the defendant offers to admit to 
evidence of a prior criminal conviction but the prosecution instead seeks admittance of the entire 
record of prior conviction). 
 188.  See Hidden Structure, supra note 19, at 180–83 (describing the role of such effects in 
producing a wrongful conviction in the case of People v. Rivera, No. 92 CF 2751 (Ill. 19th Cir. Ct. 
May 8, 2009), rev’d 962 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)). 
 189.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FED. R. EVID. 615; Helminski v. Ayerst Labs, 766 F.2d 208 
(6th Cir.1985) (holding that injured plaintiff was excluded improperly from the courtroom when the 
plaintiff was excluded based only on plaintiff’s described condition). 
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parties were absenting themselves in response to the court’s own 
suggestion, this would be unlikely to occur. 
Such a strategy would work particularly well if judges use their other 
powers to calm the intensity of the jurors’ emotions before the 
proceedings are resumed.  Scheduling inflammatory testimony to occur 
shortly before the end of a day would give the jurors a night to cool off 
before testimony is resumed.  In addition, judicial admonitions might 
encourage jurors to take steps to control their own feelings.  If properly 
motivated, we can often calm our feelings and return ourselves to a more 
neutral state.190  Thus, a juror who has been told that their duty is to 
decide the case based on the evidence, and who has been warned that the 
intense feelings they feel with respect to one aspect of the case should be 
kept separate from unrelated issues, might be willing to take steps on 
their own to calm their feelings, and might be more likely to question 
their intuitions when it comes time to deliberate.  Thus, by separating the 
juror’s experience of emotionally arousing evidence from the parties in 
space, time, and motivation, courts might be able to get the probative 
benefits of such information while avoiding its prejudice. 
Third, courts can mitigate the intensity of task-incongruent emotions, 
in some cases, by requiring parties to admit evidence in less affecting 
forms.  In the above example involving graphic crime scene evidence 
where the primary defense is one of alibi, often the same facts that a 
photo or video could reveal may also be conveyed to the jury through 
testimony, perhaps with the assistance of less affecting demonstrative 
aids.  This, I must make clear, would not be an appropriate restriction in 
all cases; if the primary question in a murder trial was whether the act 
was intentional, for instance, the strong emotions that arise from seeing 
the scene might indeed further the process of evaluating whether the 
crime was “heinous” or “malicious” within the meaning of a relevant 
statutory definition.191  But when the facts are only tangentially relevant 
in the case, such as when they are necessary to complete the prosecutor’s 
overall narrative but not essentially disputed by the defendant, those 
same emotions may undermine the jury’s ability to fairly consider the 
alibi testimony.  Thus, presenting the same information in a less intense 
form might allow the prosecutor to convey his story without undermining 
                                                          
 190.  Gross, supra note 139, at 6–10 (discussing various methods by which individuals prevent 
or regulate unwanted emotions); Emotional Regulation, supra note 65, at 1509–28. 
 191.  See SIMON, supra note 137, at 173, 345 n.198 (identifying that in some statutes, 
determining whether a murder was intentional can be based on the “heinousness” of the crime). 
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the defendant’s opportunity to have his defense considered in an even-
handed way. 
For an instructive example of how this sort of active emotional 
management can work to improve the process, consider Judge Carl 
Rubin’s management of a large, consolidated trial involving the drug 
Bendectin.192  In that case, nearly a thousand plaintiffs alleged that they 
suffered from birth defects caused by their mother’s use of the drug.  
These allegations presented a classic problem of hybrid emotion: The 
injuries suffered by the plaintiffs were quite relevant to assessing their 
damages, but were completely irrelevant to the difficult questions of 
scientific causation at issue in the case.  Moreover, the stakes of this 
were particularly intense in the context of a large, consolidated trial 
proceeding.  To address this, Judge Rubin thoughtfully combined two of 
the strategies discussed above.  First, he issued an order that trifurcated 
the case, with proof of causation occurring first so that the jury could 
evaluate the expert testimony on that question without feeling strong 
emotions of sympathy for the plaintiffs that were incongruent to that 
task.193  Second, he issued an order excluding any young or visibly 
deformed plaintiffs from the courtroom, and made provisions for them to 
monitor the case by closed-circuit television from another room, in case 
the jury should be strongly moved by their appearance to search for 
reasons why the defendant might in fact be liable.194  The jury 
subsequently concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to prove causation, a 
conclusion which was in accord with the weight of scientific evidence on 
the question.195  Such measures were strong medicine (particularly the 
exclusion of parties from the courtroom),196 but given the high stakes of 
                                                          
 192.  See In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d 290, 296 (6th Cir. 1988). 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id.; see David E. Bernstein, Learning the Wrong Lessons from “an American Tragedy”: A 
Critique of the Berger-Twerski Informed Choice Proposal, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1961, 1963–67 (2005) 
(surveying the relevant scientific studies at the time of the litigation and explaining that “a review of 
the relevant medical literature finds a consensus that Bendectin is not a teratogen”). 
 196.  The Sixth Circuit did not reverse the exclusion, but it did opine that it probably would 
violate a subsequently announced rule (which it declined to apply retroactively).  The new rule 
barred the exclusion of any non-consenting plaintiff who “can assist counsel and understand the 
proceedings . . . regardless of prejudicial impact,” and directed courts to use limiting instructions 
instead.  In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d at 324 (citing Helminski v. Ayerst Laboratories, 766 
F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985)).  Perhaps there are reasons, grounded in dignitary interests or the 
legitimacy of the trial process, why we might wish to follow such a rule, but at least in cases like the 
Bendectin MDL, we should be cognizant of the possibility that we will pay an accuracy penalty for 
doing so. 
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the question and the significant possibility of influence by incongruent 
emotion, it is likely that those measures were critical to achieving an 
accurate outcome at trial. 
C. Empowering and Encouraging Judges to Respond Appropriately to 
Emotionally Potent Evidence 
Of course, judges have, at present, the power to do all of these 
things, based on their authority under Federal Rule of Evidence 611 and 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42.  To the extent that they understand 
the value of preventing or mitigating the arousal of task-incongruent 
emotions, they may already pursue this objective under that rule, which 
allows them to take such measures whenever it helps to “make . . . [trial] 
procedures effective for determining the truth.”197  Judges may not use 
trial management techniques to curtail the dangerous aspects of emotions 
as often as we would like; however, the problem is not that judges lack 
sufficient authority.  What judges do lack, however, are three things.  
First, courts receive relatively little encouragement towards using their 
authority to shape the emotional content of trials, because the existing 
rules channel them towards one extreme option—the total exclusion of 
an item of evidence—which they are naturally reluctant to employ.  
Second, judges receive little training in the ways that emotions can 
influence fact-finding, and thus they are likely to fall back on common 
sense and intuition to decide when emotions are worth worrying about.  
Unfortunately, the dominant common sense approach to this question 
seems to be the mistaken classical view.  As a result, judges too easily 
fall prey to a common pair of mistakes: Judges tend to view most 
emotions as dangerous, but they also tend to assume that the danger can 
be controlled by a fact-finder’s act of will.  And finally, judges lack a 
means of effectively pursuing these strategies in the many cases that are 
tried to a bench, due to the lack of a meaningful process by which parties 
can raise objections in that context.  Accordingly, the best means of 
reforming judicial management of trial emotions would be a three-
pronged approach, combining rule reform, judicial education, and a new 
procedure for raising evidentiary objections during bench trials. 
The first step would be rule reform, with the aim, not of giving new 
powers to judges, but instead of encouraging them to deploy a broader 
                                                          
 197.  FED. R. EVID. 611(a)(1). 
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set of solutions when confronted with potential emotional prejudice.  To 
this end, we could rewrite Rule 403 along the following lines: 
 
Revised Rule 403: 
a. When the probative value of evidence is outweighed by a 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading 
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence, the court should take appropriate 
action. 
b. Unfair prejudice includes the activation of strong emotions 
that are likely to incline the fact-finder towards an unjust 
decision, such as when the party’s identity or aspects of the 
evidence result in unfair favoritism towards or against the 
party.  Strong emotions that are tied to a jury’s perception 
that a party committed charged conduct should not generally 
be viewed as giving rise to prejudice, however. 
c. When the improper effects of evidence outweigh its 
probative value, the court should consider, and apply as 
appropriate, the following means of mitigating that 
prejudice: 
1. Requiring a party to delay admitting the prejudicial 
evidence until the jury has formed a clearer picture 
of related facts from less prejudicial sources of 
information. 
2. Scheduling a recess or continuance in the 
proceedings following the introduction of the 
evidence, so that the fact-finder can return to a 
calmer state before considering further evidence. 
3. Encouraging the parties to absent themselves from 
the courtroom while emotionally affecting evidence 
is presented, to avoid giving rise to associations 
between the evidence and a party. 
4. Exercising the discretionary authority to bifurcate a 
trial or sever the cases of co-parties. 
5. Requiring the party offering an inflammatory piece 
of evidence to present it in a less prejudicial form. 
6. Giving limiting instructions that impress upon the 
jury’s mind the reasons why they should avoid 
letting a particular emotion impact their reasoning 
about other issues in the case. 
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d. When the improper effects of evidence substantially 
outweigh its probative value, despite any corrective 
measures the court could employ, it should be excluded. 
 
This revision is meant to accomplish several objectives.  First, it 
explicitly encourages judges to mitigate emotional prejudice by less 
severe means than total exclusion and more effective measures than 
limiting instructions.  Second, the revised rule signals to judges that they 
have a duty to explore these means whenever they believe that the 
prejudicial impacts of evidence are likely to be more powerful than its 
rational force, unlike the present rule, which applies only when prejudice 
“substantially” outweighs probity.  And third, it guides judges towards 
some specific alternative options, and clarifies the difference between 
emotions in general and task-incongruent emotions in particular. 
But this rule reform, although it would be helpful on its own, would 
work best if combined with an effort to help judges better understand the 
subtle ways that emotions and cognition interact.  Law schools do not 
typically provide this sort of instruction to lawyers in training, nor is it a 
standard component of the information provided to most new judges 
when they take the bench.198  Despite this lack of training, we expect 
judges, on a daily basis, to determine when the emotional impact of 
evidence will outweigh its helpful qualities.  This might be acceptable if 
the bulk of psychological research on emotions amounted to mere 
common sense, but sadly that is not the case.  Most judges, I would 
hazard to say, would be surprised to learn that feeling too little emotion 
can be as harmful as feeling too much.  Likewise, it is common to think 
that emotions influence our preferences a fair amount, but have relatively 
little impact on what we perceive, what we remember, or how we 
analyze facts held in mind.  Finally, the proliferation of limiting 
instructions in modern trials seems to ignore the real possibility that too 
much cognitive effort expended towards emotional suppression and 
control can make it harder for jurors to reason carefully about the facts in 
the case, and perversely make them more susceptible to emotional 
influences that have already occurred.199  Thus, the rule reform I describe 
above would function even better if new trial judges could receive a short 
                                                          
 198.  Emotional Regulation, supra note 65, at 1520.  The FJC has recently taken a very 
encouraging step in this direction, which one hopes will serve as a model for similar projects at the 
state level.  See Maroney, supra note 68. 
 199.  Emotional Regulation, supra note 65, at 1534–35, 1539. 
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course of training in emotional psychology, just as they currently receive 
other forms of instruction. 
Finally, the current regime is clearly suboptimal because it treats 
judges as if they have a mystical superiority in terms of their levels of 
emotional control.  Although the rules of evidence apply equally to judge 
and jury trials, at least on paper,200 attorneys make far fewer evidentiary 
objections during bench trials.  Given that the same judge acts as 
evidentiary decider and fact-finder in the typical bench-trial, this should 
not be surprising, especially in the context of emotionally inflammatory 
evidence.  Since many judges take pride in their prudence and self-
control, parties risk alienating judges by suggesting that they would be 
influenced by their feelings in addition to the facts.  Furthermore, 
lawyers know that judges will learn of the underlying facts by the 
arguments on the objection, even if the judge eventually grants the 
objection.  Thus, to the extent that lawyers believe that the judge might 
not be able to substantially restrain the effects of emotion on her 
thinking, it may seem fruitless to object, in the present system. 
This dynamic, however, can and should be changed.  First, numerous 
studies have shown that judges are no different from the rest of us when 
it comes to the interactions between their reasoning and their feelings.  
For judges, just like everyone else, exposure to inadmissible evidence 
can influence subsequent decisions.201  Thus, in the many cases that are 
tried to the bench, it would be prudent to devise a regime that lets parties 
object to emotionally prejudicial evidence without alerting the fact-
finding judge to the underlying facts.  This could be done by appointing a 
magistrate or other judge who works at the same court to act as an 
adjunct during the window shortly before and during the trial, hearing 
evidentiary disputes that the parties would prefer not to bring before the 
deciding judge.  If such motions are granted, parties could be subjected 
to contempt sanctions if they inform the fact-finding judge of facts that 
have been deemed inadmissible by the adjunct.  This procedure might be 
slightly cumbersome, and indeed it would seem wise to exempt many of 
the evidence rules from its purview, so as to avoid collateral disputes 
over authentication or conditional relevance that risk protracting the 
                                                          
 200.  See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 10, at § 1:3. 
 201.  See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Altering Attention in Adjudication, 60 UCLA L. REV. 
1586, 1609–15 (2013) (noting that “judges are often influenced by evidence even after they have 
ruled it inadmissible”); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The 
Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (2005) (concluding that 
judges are generally unable to avoid the influence of relevant but inadmissible evidence). 
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overall proceedings.  But if instituted, either through local rules or 
through broader procedural reforms, it could go a long way towards 
assuring parties that problematic emotional influences will not unduly 
sway a fact-finding judge during a bench trial. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have offered a new way of thinking about the 
functions of emotions at trial.  Existing accounts paint emotions, 
alternatively, as either a pernicious force that undermines reason, as a 
reliable means of making decisions fairer and more empathetic, or as a 
jumble of influences that is too complex to be meaningfully regulated by 
trial judges.  By contrast, I have tried to offer a view that accounts for 
both the beneficial and harmful impacts of emotions, framed at a level of 
complexity that strikes a balance between respecting the underlying 
realities while still enabling real-world implementation. 
Evidence at trial will inevitably induce emotional responses in fact-
finders, whether the cases are being tried to judges or juries.  Some of 
those emotions will aid fair decision-making, because they arise in 
response to indications of the presence or absence of wrong-doing and 
encourage fact-finders to respond appropriately to such wrong-doing 
through their verdict decisions.  When such task-congruent emotions are 
activated, fact-finders will be better able to notice salient aspects of the 
evidence, to remember it in deliberations, and to arrive at an appropriate 
verdict decision at the conclusion of trial. 
By contrast, other emotions can arise that do not have such beneficial 
effects.  When the evidence causes a judge or jury to feel things that 
influence the way they perceive and evaluate the evidence, but which do 
not reflect the likelihood that the disputed misconduct actually occurred, 
then such emotions risk undermining the fairness and accuracy of factual 
and legal determinations.  Importantly, these “task-incongruent” 
emotions will have effects on how evidence is perceived, assimilated, 
and remembered, and not just on what a juror wants to do at the close of 
the case.  Luckily, judges have many strategies that can moderate such 
pernicious influences short of totally excluding inflammatory, but 
relevant, evidence.  By the combination of rule reform and judicial 
education that I outline above, we should be able to realize a better 
balance between the beneficial and problematic effects of emotions in 
fact-finding. 
 
